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Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation is to reexamine the dividend information 
hypothesis and to provide additional evidence on the nature of the information 
revealed by dividend initiations. Evidence on (1) announcing firms’ stock price 
reactions, (2) analyst earnings forecast revisions for announcing firms, (3) rivals’ 
stock price reactions, and (4) analyst earnings forecast revisions for rivals will be 
presented. On average, the stock market reacts positively to the announcement of 
dividend initiations and the degree of this reaction can be significantly explained by 
three information proxies: dividend yield, firm size, and trading volume. Moreover, 
I find that dividend initiation announcement month earnings forecasts by analysts 
are systematically revised upward for a sample of dividend initiating firms on the 
I /B /E /S  tape. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that a dividend 
initiation announcement conveys favorable information about the announcing firm’s 
earnings prospects.
However, this information may not be entirely firm-specific. It may have an 
industry component and therefore have a contagion (positive) effect on other firms 
in the industry. On the other hand, the information may imply that rivals face an 
unexpectedly competitive and prosperous firm. In this scenario, the dividend 
initiation will affect rivals negatively. The second part of this dissertation examines 
the external nature of the information revealed by dividend initiations. I analyze 
earnings forecast revisions and stock price reactions for industry rivals upon the 
announcement of dividend initiation. The evidence shows no stock price reactions
for rivals. I also observe no significant analyst forecast revisions for rivals during 
the announcement month. This finding supports the hypothesis that dividend 
initiations reveal firm-specific information only. Cross-sectional analyses of rivals’ 
stock price reactions and rivals’ earnings forecast revisions indicate that they are not 




There is a general consensus that changes in dividends, and dividend 
initiations in particular, convey private information to investors about the firms’ 
prospects. Lintner’s (1956) survey of managers’ attitudes toward corporate dividend 
policy reveals the following conclusions. First, a major unanticipated and non- 
transitory change in earnings would be a good reason to change dividends. Second, 
most managers try to maintain a "smooth" dividend payout. The implication is that 
dividend-paying firms increase their dividends only when management is confident 
that higher dividends can be maintained in the future. Therefore, if managers have 
private information about firms’ earnings prospects, changes of dividend may be 
interpreted as a signal about management’s beliefs.
Miller and Modigliani (1961) demonstrate that, under conditions of perfect 
capital markets and zero taxes, dividends do not affect the value of the firm. They 
point out that dividends may have information content if managers have better 
information than investors about the firm’s future earnings and use that information 
to set current dividends. Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), Miller 
and Rock (1985), and Ofer and Thakor (1987) formally derive equilibrium 
conditions for dividends to carry information.
Empirical results on unexpected dividend changes are generally consistent 
with dividend information models. Studies by Aharony and Swary (1980), Brickley 
(1983), Dielman and Oppenheimer (1984), and Kalay and Lowenstein (1985, 1986)
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document small but significant positive (negative) abnormal returns at the 
announcement of unexpected dividend increases (decreases). Ofer and Siegel 
(1987) find that analysts revise their earnings per share forecasts after the 
announcement of an unexpected dividend change. Using a generalized friction 
model, Kao and Wu (1994) provide strong support for Lintner’s (1956) findings. 
Their results not only indicate a positive relation between unexpected changes in 
dividends and permanent earnings but also reflect the industry practice of dividend 
smoothing.
Studies on dividend initiation start with Asquith and Mullins (1983) who 
define an initiating dividend as either the first dividend in the corporate history or 
the resumption of dividends after at least ten years of non-payment. They argue 
that, compared with subsequent dividend changes, initial dividends are more likely 
to be unexpected. If dividend initiation is unexpected, the market reaction on the 
announcement day should capture the full effect of the dividend change. Therefore, 
the hypothesized dividend effects should be most visible at initiation.
Both Asquith and Mullins (1983) and Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson
(1986) show large and significant positive two-day abnormal returns in response to 
dividend initiation announcements, 3.7% to 4.0%. The result is not caused by 
contemporaneous announcements such as earnings reports, and the excess return 
is positively related to the size of the initial dividend payment. Asquith and Mullins 
(1983) interpret this to mean that investors welcome the initiation of dividends
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because it establishes a mechanism by which management can communicate private 
information about future cash flows.
Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson (1986) further study trading volume 
around the initial dividend announcement date, and between the announcement and 
the ex-dividend date. Unusual trading volume may be evidence of clientele changes 
induced when high tax bracket shareholders sell to low tax bracket investors after 
the higher dividend payout is announced. Alternatively, a significant volume change 
may be a response to good news about future earnings contained in the dividend 
announcement. Results indicate that highly significant abnormal volume increases 
during the announcement week are related to the information content in the 
announcement as measured by the abnormal return. There is only weak evidence 
for higher volume following the announcement week, up to and including the ex- 
dividend week, and hence only weak support for clientele adjustments. These 
results suggest that the price adjustments associated with dividend initiations are 
primarily attributable to a signal about future earnings rather than a clientele effect.
Having recognized the existence of the information effect, Venkatesh (1989) 
examines the nature of the information contained in the dividend initiation 
announcement. Specifically, he analyzes whether dividends and earnings 
announcements are substitutes or complements in terms of the information they 
convey. He shows that stock price reactions to earnings announcements are 
significantly lower after the introduction of quarterly cash dividends, regardless of 
whether the earnings announcements precede or follow the related dividend
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announcements. This evidence seems to suggest that these two announcements are 
partial "information substitutes" and that dividend initiations reveal information 
about firms’ future earnings.
In addition, the volatility of daily returns is found to be lower in the post­
dividend period, primarily because of a decrease in firm-specific risk (residual 
variance); there is no change in systematic risk (beta). This finding can be 
interpreted as evidence to support the conjecture that an increase in the earnings 
stream, rather than a decrease in the risk, contributes to the increase in firm value.
Healy and Palepu (1988) provide empirical evidence that investors interpret 
announcements of dividend initiations and omissions as managers’ forecasts of 
future earnings changes. They examine whether there are significant changes in 
firms’ earnings performance surrounding either a dividend initiation or omission, 
and, if so, whether these changes are consistent with the market reaction to the 
dividend policy changes. The following evidence is offered. First, there are 
significant earnings increases/decreases for at least one year before dividend 
initiation/omission announcements. Second, dividend-initiating firms experience 
earnings increases in the year of the dividend initiation and for two subsequent 
years, but not thereafter. Third, the stock price reaction to the "unexpected" 
component of annual earnings announcements is generally smaller after dividend 
initiation; however, the reduction is statistically significant only in the year of the 
initial dividend. Fourth, abnormal stock price reactions to the dividend initiations 
or omissions are correlated with the firms’ earnings changes in the year of and in
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the year after the dividend announcement. Fifth, the m arket reaction to earnings 
changes is less than usual in the year following dividend omission.
John and Lang (1991) observe a relation between the direction of insider 
trading and the stock price reaction to subsequent announcements of dividend 
initiation. The extent of insijder buying is positively related to the subsequent stock 
price reaction to the announcements of initial dividend payments. This evidence 
again lends support to the information hypothesis that dividend initiations convey 
favorable information and that insiders attempt to profit from it.
In sum, the empirical literature on dividend initiations tends to support the 
information hypothesis.1 However, little research has been conducted on the 
reactions of (1) analyst earnings forecasts and (2) industry rivals to the 
announcement of initial dividends. My research offers empirical evidence on these 
two issues and examines their implications for the dividend information hypothesis.
The first issue is motivated by the conflicting empirical evidence found by 
Ofer and Siegel (1987) and by Lang and Litzenberger (1989). It centers on the 
question of whether security analysts significantly revise their forecasts of earnings 
after the announcement of first dividend payment. The second issue arises from the 
inconsistency between the prediction made by Marsh and M erton (1987) and the 
empirical result shown by Healy and Palepu (1988). It involves the question of
1 An analysis of dividend initiating firms’ financial characteristics by Wansley 
and Lane (1987) also lends support to the signaling model.
whether the dividend initiation announcement conveys industry-wide or firm-specific 
information.
These two issues are addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. In each 
chapter I review the literature, identify the problems, formulate the hypotheses, 
describe the data, review the empirical tests, and present the results. I then 
conclude the dissertation in Chapter 4 with a summary.
Chapter 2
Changes in Earnings Forecasts for Dividend Initiating Firms
2.1. Introduction
In general, dividends may convey information about the expected value 
and /o r the risk of future cash flows. Studies on dividend initiations tend to support 
the conclusion that the increase in firm value at the initiation announcement stems 
from an increase in the future earnings stream rather than from a decrease in the 
underlying riskiness of the firms’ earnings [see Healy and Palepu (1988) and 
Venkatesh (1989)]. However, at least one important issue remains unresolved in 
the literature. If the announcement of a dividend initiation reveals earnings 
information, analysts may be expected to revise their earnings forecasts. Therefore, 
no significant earnings forecast revision upon the dividend initiation announcement 
will serve as a null hypothesis in this study.
Two studies of analyst earnings forecast revisions at the announcement of 
unexpected dividend changes show conflicting results. Ofer and Siegel (1987) 
provide evidence that security analysts revise their earnings forecasts following the 
announcement of an unexpected dividend change by an amount positively related 
to the size of the unexpected dividend change. In addition, these revisions are 
positively related to the stock price response surrounding the announcement. 
Hence, market participants seem to use the information from unexpected dividend 
changes to form earnings expectations. In contrast, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
find that the effect of dividend change announcements on earnings expectations
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(analysts’ forecasts of earnings) is not statistically significant. In this chapter I use 
a sample of dividend initiations to provide complementary evidence on this issue.
An analysis of earnings forecast revisions complements the study of stock 
price reactions, for several reasons. First, according to the signaling model, the 
observed stock price reaction is attributable to the fact that m arket participants 
rationally revise their expectations after the announcement and act upon the newly 
released information in the security market. A study of earnings forecast revisions, 
therefore, provides direct evidence regarding whether market participants revise 
their expectations about firms’ earnings prospects following the announcement of 
dividend initiation. Brown and Rozeff (1978), Fried and Givoly (1982), and Brown, 
Griffin, Hagerman, and Zmijewski (1987) all show that analyst earnings forecasts 
are a better proxy for investors’ earnings expectations than is a time series model 
[e.g., Healy and Palepu (1988)].
Second, this approach is potentially fruitful because it sheds some light on 
distinguishing between the dividend information hypothesis and the wealth transfer 
hypothesis. The stockholder wealth effect reflects both the wealth transfer (if any) 
between different security holders and the information conveyed by the 
announcement, while the analyst earnings forecasts reflect only the latter.
A study of stock price reaction is also provided in this chapter in order to 
examine whether my sample is compatible with those of previous studies. This 
study makes three additional contributions. First, I expand my sample to include 
NASDAQ firms, which are excluded from previous studies. Second, I find a price
run-up during the pre-announcement period starting from day -135. This result is 
consistent with Healy and Palepu (1988) who report an earnings increase for at 
least one year before the dividend initiation announcement. Third, I conduct a 
cross-sectional regression of stock price reaction and show that it is significantly 
related to three information proxies, dividend yield, firm size, and abnormal trading 
volume.
Presumably if dividends are a signaling device, the size of the dividend is a 
measure of the magnitude of the signal. This conjecture is confirmed by Asquith 
and Mullins (1983) who show a positive and significant linear relationship between 
the size of the initial dividend (as measured by the annualized dividend yield) and 
the m arket’s reaction to the initiation announcement (as measured by each firm’s 
two-day abnormal return). Therefore, I use the annualized dividend yield as the 
first independent variable to explain cross-sectional differences in the abnormal 
returns during the announcement period.
Bajaj and Vijh (1990) find that the price reaction to dividend changes are 
more pronounced for smaller firms. This evidence is consistent with the view that 
smaller firms are less followed by analysts and therefore the unexpected information 
release from smaller firms are more informative. Hence, I use firm size, proxied 
by the market value of common shares, as the second factor to explain the 
magnitude of the price reaction to dividend initiation announcements. A negative 
relationship is expected.
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Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson (1986) report a significant and positive 
relationship between the stock price reaction at the initial dividend announcement 
and the abnormal trading volume. They interpret this evidence as supportive of the 
dividend information hypothesis. In this study I use the mean-adjusted two-day 
cumulative abnormal trading volume as the third explanatory variable.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
sample selection procedure and summary statistics for data. Section 3 presents the 
empirical methodology. Section 4 contains a discussion of results. Section 5 gives 
a conclusion.
2.2. Data
Using the Asquith and Mullins (1983) definition of dividend initiation, I 
employ the following sample selection procedure.
(1) I search the 1992 Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tape 
(both NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ) for either the first cash dividend payment since 
the listing of the stock or the resumption dividend payment after at least ten years 
of non-payment.
(2) Firms which have their first ex-dividend dates during the first year of 
listing in the CRSP tape are excluded. This requirement guarantees data 
availability for market model estimation in an event study. It also precludes any 
contamination from the new listing effect documented by McConnell and Sanger
(1987).
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(3) The dividend has to be identified by the CRSP distribution code 
(DISTCD) as a U.S. dollar-denominated ordinary cash dividend which is fully 
taxable as ordinary income to individuals.
(4) The annual cumulative issues of Moody’s Dividend Record between 1968 
and 1992 must verify the above information.
(5) The announcement date of dividend initiation, day 0, must be available 
in the Wall Street Journal Index (WSJI).
(6) Dividends are paid on ordinary common stock only. Therefore, 
dividends on preferred stocks, dual class stocks, non-voting stocks, units, ADRs, and 
Shares of Beneficial Interest are excluded.
(7) Firms must have non-missing stock returns on day -1 and day 0 from the 
CRSP tape. At least 60 non-missing daily stock returns during the estimation 
period between day -135 and day -16 must be available from the CRSP tape.
(8) The SIC code at the announcement must be available from the CRSP
tape.
The number of outstanding shares and the closing stock price on day -15 are 
obtained from the CRSP tape. Also obtained are the trading volume and the 
number of outstanding shares from day -135 to day +15. The amount of the 
dividend and the frequency of dividend payment are retrieved from the Moody’s 
Dividend Record. These data are used to compute the total market equity value, 
a proxy for firm size, the abnormal trading volume, and the expected annualized 
dividend yield, a measure of dividend size.
12
In order to remove any confounding influence on stock price, I record from 
the WSJI any contemporaneous event during the seven-day period surrounding the 
dividend announcement date. These contamination announcements include (but 
are not limited to) news on earnings, extra dividends, special dividends, stock 
dividends, stock splits, mergers and acquisitions, and expansion plans.
The complete stock price sample (complete CRSP sample) consists of 613 
dividend initiating stocks of which 266 are traded on NYSE/ASE and 347 are 
traded on NASDAQ. The announcement dates range from 1968 to 1992 for 
NYSE/ASE sample and from 1973 to 1992 for NASDAQ sample. In addition, 211 
of 613 initial dividend announcements are accompanied by other WSJI 
announcements within the (-3 ,+  3) window. The rest of the 402 announcements 
constitute the clean CRSP sample. The announcement dates range from 1969 to 
1992 for 163 NYSE/ASE firms and from 1973 to 1992 for 239 NASDAQ firms.
Table 1 reports the distribution of the complete/clean CRSP sample by 
announcement years, by announcement months, by announced dividend frequency, 
and by exchange. Except for the period 1975-1977, when more than 30% of firms 
announced their initial dividends, there seems to be no significant concentration of 
sample firms. Dividend initiations also seem to be evenly distributed over the 12 
calendar months. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for some characteristics of the 
CRSP sample. The median number of announcements per industry (SIC code) is 
one across four different panels. This suggests that the CRSP sample is not subject 
to an industry selection bias.
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Table 1
Frequency distribution of the dividend initiation announcements made by NYSE/ASE 
(1968-1992) and NASDAQ (1973-1992) firms with stock return data available from CRSP 
tape.
The clean sample excludes initiation announcements contaminated by other WSJI events 
within the (-3,+ 3) window while the complete sample does not.
NYSE/ASE & NASDAQ NYSE/ASE
Complete Clean Complete Clean
Panel A: By announcement year
Year Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
1968 2 0.3 2 0.8
1969 2 0.3 1 0.2 2 0.8 1 0.6
1970 3 0.5 1 0.2 3 1.1 1 0.6
1971 9 1.5 4 1.0 9 3.4 4 2.5
1972 12 2.0 7 1.7 12 4.5 7 4.3
1973 30 4.9 26 6.5 29 10.9 25 15.3
1974 40 6.5 26 6.5 18 6.8 10 6.1
1975 72 11.7 45 11.2 31 11.7 18 11.0
1976 63 10.3 40 10.0 36 13.5 22 13.5
1977 58 9.5 39 9.7 29 10.9 18 11.0
1978 26 4.2 14 3.5 9 3.4 4 2.5
1979 19 3.1 11 2.7 10 3.8 4 2.5
1980 15 2.4 13 3.2 9 3.4 7 4.3
1981 4 0.7 4 1.0 3 1.1 3 1.8
1982 8 1.3 4 1.0 6 2.3 2 1.2
1983 6 1.0 5 1.2 5 1.9 4 2.5
1984 18 2.9 12 3.0 5 1.9 2 1.2
1985 24 3.9 16 4.0 7 2.6 5 3.1
1986 19 3.1 14' 3.5 4 1.5 2 1.2
1987 57 9.3 35 8.7 11 4.1 5 3.1
1988 41 6.7 26 6.5 6 2.3 4 2.5
1989 38 6.2 29 7.2 10 3.8 7 4.3
1990 20 3.3 12 3.0 3 1.1 3 1.8
1991 14 2.3 9 2.2 2 0.8 1 0.6
1992 13 2.1 9 2.2 5 1.9 4 2.5
Total 613 100.0 402 100.0 266 100.0 163 100.0
(table con’d.)
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NYSE/ASE & NASDAQ NYSE/ASE
Complete Clean Complete Clean
Panel B: By announcement month
Month Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Jan 51 8.3 33 8.2 18 6.8 11 6.7
Feb 46 7.5 28 7.0 22 8.3 13 8.0
Mar 58 9.5 38 9.5 21 7.9 13 8.0
Apr 57 9.3 30 7.5 24 9.0 10 6.1
May 60 9.8 40 10.0 32 12.0 20 12.3
Jun 48 7.8 31 7.7 17 6.4 11 6.7
Jul 39 6.4 26 6.5 14 5.3 8 4.9
Aug 44 7.2 29 7.2 15 5.6 9 5.5
Sep 35 5.7 24 6.0 19 7.1 10 6.1
Oct 57 9.3 28 7.0 30 11.3 16 9.8
Nov 66 10.8 53 13.2 29 10.9 23 14.1
Dec 52 8.5 42 10.4 25 9.4 19 11.7
Total 613 100.0 402 100.0 266 100.0 163 100.0
Panel C: By announced dividend distribution frequency
Dividend Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Unspecified 235 38.3 150 37.3 84 31.6 52 31.9
Monthly 1 0.2 • 1 0.2
Quarterly 274 44.7 184 45.8 130 48.9 83 50.9
Semi-annual 74 12.1 44 10.9 41 15.4 20 12.3
Annual 29 4.7 23 5.7 11 4.1 8 4.9
Total 613 100.0 402 100.0 266 
Panel D: By exchange
100.0 163 100.0











266 100.0 163 100.0
Total 613 100.0 402 100.0 266 100.0 163 100.0
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for dividend initiation announcing firms in the stock price reaction 
study.
The clean sample excludes initiation announcements contaminated by other WSJI events 
within the (-3,+ 3) window while the complete sample does not.
N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
Panel A: Complete NYSE/ASE & NASDAQ sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 613 0.095 0.213 0.005 0.050 4.500
(S)
MARKET EQUITY VALUE 613 60.567 199.085 0.848 19.232 4273.202
(million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 294 2.085 3.231 1.000 1.000 40.000
PER SIC CODE
Panel B: Clean NYSE/ASE & NASDAQ sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 402 0.087 0.122 0.005 0.050 2.000
($)
MARKET EQUITY VALUE 402 54.775 107.102 0.848 18.819 820.336
(million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 216 1.861 2.805 1.000 1.000 33.000
PER SIC CODE
Panel C: Complete NYSE/ASE sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 266 0.093 0.149 0.010 0.050 2.000
($)
MARKET EQUITY VALUE 266 62.623 114.516 1.298 20.379 828.793
(million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 171 1.556 1.342 1.000 1.000 12.000
PER SIC CODE
Panel D: Clean NYSE/ASE sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 163 0.095 0.172 0.010 0.05 2.000
($)
MARKET EQUITY VALUE 163 61.290 109.691 1.298 20.516 820.336
(million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 116 1.405 1.111 1.000 1.000 9.000
PER SIC CODE
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For the purpose of studying earnings forecast revisions by analysts, I obtain 
analyst annual earnings per share (EPS) forecasts from the Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System (I/B /E /S ) tape. Forecasts for more than 3,500 U.S. publicly 
traded companies are collected by I /B /E /S  on a monthly basis from more than 
2,100 securities analysts employed by 140 participating institutional brokerage and 
research firms. The I /B /E /S  summary statistics file (updated in March 1993) 
contains 2,078,426 consensus forecasts made between January 1976 and March 1993. 
Each firm’s forecast is a consensus of individual analyst forecasts calculated on the 
third Thursday of each month.
Matching 613 firms from the complete CRSP sample with the I /B /E /S  
database yields 183 (122) firms with available EPS forecasts, in the dividend 
initiation announcement month, for the current (following) fiscal year. Because the 
exact date that analysts make their forecasts is unknown, I use the (-15, +15) 
window for screening out the confounding effect of other events during the 
announcement month. After excluding firms with contemporaneous news in the 
WSJI within the ± 15 day window surrounding the announcement date, I obtain the 
clean I /B /E /S  sample with a size of 72 and 51 firms for the current year forecast 
and the following year forecast, respectively.
A time series (from seven months before to six months after the 
announcement) of the means of the individual analysts’ forecasts is then collected 
for each firm. I use the mean of the analysts’ earnings forecasts as the consensus
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because Makridakis and Winkler (1983) and Conroy and Harris (1987) show that 
a simple arithmetic average improves accuracy over individual earnings forecasts.
The frequency distribution and the descriptive statistics of this 
com plete/clean I /B /E /S  sample are reported in tables 3 and 4, respectively. Table 
3 indicates that more than 45% of firms in the I /B /E /S  sample announced their 
initial dividend between 1987 and 1989 while there seems to be no significant 
concentration on the announcement month basis. Similar to the CRSP sample, I 
find no industry clustering for the I /B /E /S  sample from table 4. However, the 
market equity value in table 4 is on average larger than that in table 2. The 
observation that the firm size in the CRSP sample is smaller than that in the 
I /B /E /S  sample may help explain the difference in CAR(_10) between two samples. 
I will leave further discussion of this issue to section 4.
2.3. Em pirical Methods
In the first part of this section, I will discuss event study methodology for 
analyzing the stock price reaction to the dividend initiation announcement. First, 
I assume that daily stock returns follow the market model in the form
R - i , t  —  +  £ i R m ,t  e i , t ’
where R, t is the stock return for firm i on day t, R m, is the market return proxy 
represented by the equally-weighted return for the CRSP securities available on day 
t, aj and (3i are market model parameters for firm i, and e i|t is the disturbance term 
of firm i on day t. It is assumed that e it is normally distributed with mean zero, 
and is independently and identically distributed through time. The market model
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Table 3
Frequency distribution of the dividend initiation announcements made by NYSE/ASE and 
NASDAQ firms with forecast data available from I/B /E /S  tape.
The clean sample excludes initiation announcements contaminated by other WSJI events 
within the (-15,+15) window while the complete sample does not.
Current year EPS forecast Following year EPS forecast
Complete Clean Complete Clean
Panel A: By announcement year
Year Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
1976 10 5.5 3 2.5
1977 10 5.5 3 4.2 6 4.9 2 3.9
1978 5 2.7 3 4.2 1 0.8 1 2.0
1979 5 2.7 4 3.3
1980 3 1.6 2 2.8 2 1.6 1 2.0
1981 1 0.5
1982 2 1.1 2 1.6
1983 3 1.6 1 0.8
1984 9 4.9 5 6.9 7 5.7 4 7.8
1985 14 7.7 7 9.7 10 8.2 5 9.8
1986 14 7.7 7 9.7 7 5.7 4 7.8
1987 36 19.7 14 19.4 31 25.4 13 25.5
1988 24 13.1 11 15.3 15 12.3 8 15.7
1989 22 12.0 11 15.3 13 10.7 5 9.8
1990 10 5.5 5 6.9 7 5.7 4 7.8
1991 8 4.4 3 4.2 7 5.7 3 5.9
1992 7 3.8 1 1.4 6 4.9 1 2.0
Total 183 100.0 72 100.0 122 100.0 51 100.0
(table con’d.)
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Current year EPS forecast Following year EPS forecast
Complete Clean Complete Clean
Panel B: By announcement month
Month Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Jan 14 7.7 4 5.6 13 10.7 4 7.8
Feb 15 8.2 2 2.8 10 8.2
Mar 20 10.9 11 15.3 8 6.6 5 9.8
Apr 20 10.9 6 8.3 8 6.6 3 5.9
May 18 9.8 6 8.3 11 9.0 4 7.8
Jun 12 6.6 6 8.3 10 8.2 4 7.8
Jul 13 7.1 5 6.9 10 8.2 4 7.8
Aug 14 7.7 6 8.3 11 9.0 5 9.8
Sep 11 6.0 7 9.7 7 5.7 6 11.8
Oct 18 9.8 4 5.6 13 10.7 3 5.9
Nov 21 11.5 11 15.3 17 13.9 10 19.6
Dec 7 3.8 4 5.6 4 3.3 3 5.9
Total 183 100.0 72 100.0 122 100.0 51 100.0
Panel C: By announced dividend distribution frequency
Dividend Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Unspecified 61 33.3 20 27.8 40 32.8 15 29.4
Quarterly 107 58.5 42 58.3 73 59.8 30 28.8
Semi-annual 9 4.9 6 8.3 5 4.1 3 5.9
Annual 6 3.3 4 5.6 4 3.3 3 5.9
Total 183 100.0 72 100.0 122 100.0 51 100.0
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics for dividend initiating firms in the EPS forecast revision study.
The clean sample excludes initiation announcements contaminated by other WSJI events 
within the (-15,+ 15) window while the complete sample does not.
N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
Panel A: Complete current year EPS forecast sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 183 0.078 0.069 0.010 0.050 0.550
($)
MARKET EQUITY VALUE 183 139.570 345.050 4.454 61.422 4273.200
(million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 107 1.710 2.522 1.000 1.000 24.000
PER SIC CODE
CARi(-io) 183 0.015 0.052 -0.132 0.011 0.241
Panel B: Clean current year EPS forecast sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 72 0.082 0.056 0.020 0.070 0.400
($)
MARKET EQUITY VALUE 72 90.835 98.486 9.056 56.994 559.290
(million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 42 1.714 2.521 1.000 1.000 17.000
PER SIC CODE
CARĵ -io) 72 0.007 0.047 -0.132 0.004 0.148
Panel C: Complete following year EPS forecast sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 122 0.084 0.078 0.010 0.050 0.550
($)
MARKET EQUITY VALUE 122 179.860 415.040 8.375 87.390 4273.200
(million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 78 1.564 2.305 1.000 1.000 20.000
PER SIC CODE
CARj (.! o) 122 0.008 0.046 -0.132 0.008 0.147
Panel D: Clean following year EPS forecast sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 51 0.086 0.064 0.020 0.070 0.400
($)
MARKET EQUITY VALUE 51 100.810 106.630 9.056 61.975 559.290
(million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 31 1.645 2.374 1.000 1.000 14.000
PER SIC CODE
CAJRi (_t o) 51 -0.002 0.045 -0.132 -0.001 0.125
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for each sample firm is then estimated using the data over the 120 trading day 
period (-135,-16). Based on ordinary least squares estimates of ct; and (a; and 
bj), I then compute the abnormal return for firm i on day t during the event period, 
(-15,+15), as follows:
A R *  =  R i , t '  ( a ;  +  b j R m i t ) .
The average abnormal return on day t of the event period is then computed as the 
mean of abnormal returns on that day across a sample of N securities:
AR, = £ « ,., (ARm /  N).
Since the news actually reaches the market on either the day it appears in the Wall 
Street Journal or one day earlier, I compute the two-day cumulative average 
abnormal return, the sum of average abnormal returns on day -1 and day 0, to 
capture the full announcement effect on stock price:
CAR(.1>0) — 2°t=_j ARt.
To test whether the cumulative average abnormal return is significantly 
different from zero, I perform the traditional T  test proposed by Brown and Warner 
(1980), the standardized residual Z test suggested by Patell (1976), and the 
standardized cross-sectional T  test shown by Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen 
[BMP] (1991). A detailed description of the various test statistics can be found in 
BMP (1991). The BMP test allows for event-induced variance changes and the 
heteroscedastic event-day residuals, and is adjusted for out-of-sample prediction 
error. Therefore, the BMP method enhances the efficiency and power of the test.
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To see if there is a price run-up during the pre-announcement period, I 
calculate the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return as follows:
CAR(.1 W - = St „ . 135 [S’*,., (R,., - Rm,,)/N], 
where N is the number of firms in the sample and T  ranges from -135 to +15. A 
time series graph of CAR(.13SiT)* against event-time (measured in days) is then 
prepared.
In order to, determine the relationship between the stock price reaction and 
three information proxies, dividend yield, firm size, and trading volume, I conduct 
a cross-sectional regression. Both ordinary least squares (OLS) and weighted least 
squares (WLS) are utilized to estimate the regression. The variables used in the 
cross-sectional regression are defined as follows. First, the two-day cumulative 
abnormal return for firm i (the dependent variable) is computed as:
CARj(_10) = 2°t=-i ARiit.
Second, the expected annualized dividend yield for firm i (the first independent 
variable) is computed as:
DIVYIELD; = (1 + DIVj /  P;)n - 1, 
where DIVj is the declared dividend amount for firm i, Pj is the stock price for firm 
i on day -15, and n is equal to 1, 2, 4, or 12 for firms with annual, semi-annual, 
quarterly, or monthly dividend policies respectively. Third, the firm size for firm 
i (another independent variable) is defined as:
FIRMSIZE; = In (OUTSHARE; x p.),
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where OUTSHAREj is the outstanding number of shares for firm i on day -15. 
Fourth, following the method of normalizing trading volume suggested by 
Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson (1986), I first compute the normalized trading 
volume for firm i on day t as follows:
Vi t = In [0.001275 + 100 x (shares of firm i traded on day t) /  (shares 
outstanding for firm i on day t)].
Then the mean-adjusted two-day cumulative abnormal trading volume for firm i is 
estimated as follows:
CAVii(.li0) = z°,..i (v i., - v i). 
where Vj is the mean of Viit for firm i over the estimation period (-135,-16).
To investigate the effect of a dividend initiation announcement on analyst 
earnings forecasts, I calculate the monthly earnings forecast raw revision for firm 
i in month t as follows:
FR iit = (Fiit - F ^ )  /  Pif 
where Fj t is the consensus (mean) of analyst EPS forecasts for firm i in month t as 
reported on I /B /E /S , Fj t.j is the consensus (mean) of analyst EPS forecast for firm 
i in month t-1, and P, is the stock price 15 days before the announcement.2 The 
mean (median) of the analyst earnings forecast revisions in month t across all 
available sample firms is then computed. The student t (Wilcoxon signed rank)
2 Christie (1987) demonstrates the advantage of normalizing by the stock price.
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statistic is then used to test the null hypothesis that the mean (median) of the raw 
forecast revision is equal to zero.
If the expected forecast revision equals zero then the raw forecast revision 
is an unbiased estimate of the unexpected forecast revision. However, recent 
studies suggest that I /B /E /S  earnings forecasts are not unbiased estimates of future 
earnings. O ’Brien (1988) and Brous (1992) show that analyst earnings forecasts are 
overly optimistic at the beginning of the fiscal year and are systematically revised 
downward as the year proceeds. This optimism bias suggests a negative expected 
earnings forecast revision which biases against finding positive forecast revisions in 
the announcement month.
Further, not all analysts update their forecasts on a monthly basis; some 
analysts may only revise their forecasts after others do. In addition, some analysts 
may revise their forecasts but not report to I /B /E /S  at once. Therefore, there may 
be lags between the time the forecast is made and the time of its appearance on the 
I /B /E /S  tape. O ’Brien (1988) finds that the average individual forecast in the 
I /B /E /S  remains unchanged for 34 days. Brous (1992) documents that the monthly 
forecast revisions in the I /B /E /S  are serially correlated and that approximately 
20% of the analysts following the firm revise their forecasts each month. Thus, 
there will be four months between individual analysts’ updates. The previous four 
months’ forecast revisions are hence a necessary input into a  model that estimates 
the unexpected information released in any given month. At any rate, this first type
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of forecast "inefficiency" tends to bias towards finding no significant forecast 
revisions in the announcement month.
Brous (1992) and Brous and Kini (1993,1994) demonstrate that FRj t follows 
a fourth-order moving average process. They present evidence that a fourth-order 
moving average adjusted forecast revision can effectively eliminate the 
autocorrelation bias as well as the overoptimism bias associated with raw forecast 
revisions. The ex ante expected forecast revision for firm i in month t is, therefore, 
estimated as:
E [F R J  = kj + (1/5) x S4s=1 eijt_B.
The forecastable component (k;) is estimated for each firm as the average forecast 
revision during an estimation period, which consists of all months for which 
forecasts are available, excluding months -6 to + 6. The unforecastable component 
(e it„s) is estimated for each firm in month t-s as the difference between FR it_s and 
k|. The ex post abnormal, or unexpected, forecast revision for firm i in month t can 
be expressed as:
A FR i t = FR i t - E[FRi t].
I follow this method in computing the abnormal forecast revision for the I /B /E /S  
sample.
2.4. Results
Tables 5 to 8 present the event study results on the CRSP sample. 
Consistent with Asquith and Mullins (1983) and Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson 
(1986), the results show significant and positive abnormal returns on day 0 and day
26
Table 5
Average abnormal returns (ARt) from 10 days before to 10 days after announcements of
initial dividends for firms traded on NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ with stock return data
available from CRSP tape.
Day AR(%)
Percentage
Positive Patell-Z BW-T BMP-T N
-10 0.31 45.4 2.54 2.40 1.82 612
-9 0.03 40.6 0.67 0.20 0.62 611
-8 0.13 45.5 2.97 1.00 1.14 613
-7 0.08 44.4 1.22 0.63 1.11 613
-6 0.03 44.2 0.31 0.25 0.28 613
-5 0.32 46.8 2.59 2.47 1.92 613
-4 -0.00 45.7 0.30 -0.02 0.27 613
-3 0.37 48.8 3.04 2.84 2.30 612
-2 0.68 50.6 4.77 5.21 3.79 612
-1 1.84 60.2 16.21 14.06 7.94 613
0 1.48 56.8 11.44 11.30 7.46 613
+ 1 0.34 49.1 2.66 2.61 2.27 612
+ 2 0.35 47.3 2.89 2.66 2.30 613
+ 3 -0.05 46.2 0.74 -0.41 0.58 613
+ 4 0.11 47.8 1.36 0.85 1.17 613
+ 5 -0.11 44.2 -0.36 -0.81 -0.34 612
+ 6 -0.04 46.0 -0.56 -0.33 -0.55 613
+ 7 -0.26 43.2 -1.30 -1.98 -1.23 612
+ 8 0.08 45.4 0.55 0.60 0.50 613
+ 9 -0.01 46.5 0.72 -0.09 0.70 612
+ 10 -0.11 42.7 -0.59 . -0.87 -0.55 613
ARt = Average abnormal return on day t
Patell-Z = Standardized residual Z test statistics by Patell (1976)
BW-T = Traditional T test statistics by Brown and Warner (1980)




Average abnormal returns (ARt) from 10 days before to 10 days after clean announcements
of initial dividends for firms traded on NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ with stock return data
available from CRSP tape.




Positive Patell-Z BW-T BMP-T N
-10 0.45 45.3 3.04 2.74 1.88 401
-9 0.15 41.3 1.24 0.92 1.07 401
-8 0.15 46.3 3.03 0.90 0.96 402
-7 -0.03 43.5 0.42 -0.20 0.42 402
-6 0.09 43.0 0.78 0.55 0.67 402
-5 0.41 47.5 2.85 2.54 1.96 402
-4 0.04 46.3 0.80 0.26 0.68 402
-3 0.14 45.5 1.36 0.87 0.97 401
-2 0.59 48.0 2.81 3.61 2.20 401
-1 1.50 59.2 11.48 9.26 5.75 402
0 1.42 55.5 8.70 8.78 5.83 402
+ 1 0.27 47.8 1.77 1.66 1.64 401
+ 2 0.35 46.3 2.85 2.17 2.15 402
+ 3 -0.20 46.3 -0.48 -1.22 -0.37 402
+ 4 0.18 47.5 1.22 1.09 1.07 402
+ 5 0.02 44.8 0.73 0.15 0.66 402
+ 6 -0.10 42.5 -0.39 -0.59 -0.39 402
+ 7 -0.34 42.5 -1.74 -2.09 -1.60 401
+ 8 0.15 45.0 0.81 0.93 0.74 402
+ 9 -0.04 45.3 0.37 -0.26 0.35 402
+ 10 -0.10 43.3 -0.40 -0.64 -0.34 402
ARt = Average abnormal return on day t
Patell-Z = Standardized residual Z test statistics by Patell (1976)
BW-T = Traditional T test statistics by Brown and Warner (1980)




Average abnormal returns (ARt) from 10 days before to 10 days after announcements of




Positive Patell-Z BW-T BMP-T N
-10 0.02 46.2 -0.12 0.11 -0.13 266
-9 0.05 40.6 0.55 0.22 0.51 265
-8 0.26 48.5 1.54 1.23 1.55 266
-7 -0.02 47.0 0.21 -0.10 0.20 266
-6 0.03 48.1 0.08 0.16 0.08 266
-5 0.34 47.7 1.21 1.64 1.05 266
-4 -0.35 42.5 -1.17 -1.70 -1.27 266
-3 0.50 53.4 2.52 2.41 2.41 265
-2 0.86 53.0 3.92 4.13 3.44 266
-1 1.76 63.5 8.68 8.45 5.82 266
0 1.64 57.9 7.38 7.87 5.18 266
+ 1 0.59 52.6 2.15 2.81 1.87 265
+ 2 0.28 46.6 1.59 1.35 1.32 266
+ 3 -0.03 44.7 -0.02 -0.13 -0.02 266
+ 4 -0.02 48.1 0.63 -0.07 0.58 266
+ 5 -0.16 43.2 -1.10 -0.76 -1.20 265
+ 6 -0.30 45.1 -1.82 -1.45 -1.97 266
+ 7 -0.31 44.4 -1.00 -1.46 -0.98 265
+ 8 -0.23 43.6 -0.98 -1.10 -0.85 266
+ 9 -0.22 46.2 -0.35 -1.06 -0.37 265
+ 10 -0.20 42.5 -0.72 -0.96 -0.78 266
AR, = Average abnormal return on day t
Patell-Z = Standardized residual Z test statistics by Patell (1976)
BW-T = Traditional T test statistics by Brown and Warner (1980)




Average abnormal returns (ARt) from 10 days before to 10 days after dean announcements
of initial dividends for firms traded on NYSE/ASE with stock return data available from
CRSP tape.




Positive Patell-Z BW-T BMP-T N
-10 0.08 48.5 0.08 0.31 0.09 163
-9 0.37 44.2 1.95 1.38 1.64 163
-8 0.38 52.8 1.67 1.42 1.63 163
-7 -0.05 47.9 0.43 -0.18 0.46 163
-6 0.21 49.7 1.03 0.79 0.85 163
-5 0.50 49.7 1.29 1.86 1.09 163
-4 -0.42 42.9 -1.05 -1.58 -1.21 163
-3 -0.15 47.9 -0.19 -0.54 -0.20 162
-2 0.68 50.9 2.09 2.54 1.90 163
-1 1.96 68.1 7.55 7.31 5.67 163
0 1.72 57.1 5.60 6.41 4.09 163
+ 1 0.41 47.9 1.13 1.51 1.01 162
+ 2 0.44 47.2 2.37 1.64 1.83 163
+ 3 -0.03 46.0 -0.00 -0.11 -0.00 163
+ 4 0.04 48.5 0.87 0.17 0.83 163
+ 5 -0.03 45.4 -0.27 -0.11 -0.29 163
+ 6 -0.41 41.1 -1.45 -1.55 -1.74 163
+ 7 -0.42 44.2 -1.34 -1.57 -1.29 162
+ 8 -0.10 44.8 -0.28 -0.38 -0.26 163
+ 9 -0.18 ' 44.8 -0.18 -0.68 -0.19 163
+ 10 -0.12 46.6 -0.03 -0.46 -0.03 163
AR, = Average abnormal return on day t
Patell-Z = Standardized residual Z  test statistics by Patell (1976)
BW-T = Traditional T test statistics by Brown and Warner (1980)
BMP-T = Standardized cross-sectional T test statistics by Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen 
(1991)
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-1 . The two-day cumulative average abnormal return (CAR(.10)) for the complete 
(clean) NYSE/ASE & NASDAQ sample and the complete (clean) NYSE/ASE 
sample is 3.32% (2.92%) and 3.40% (3.68%), respectively. This evidence shows 
that NASDAQ firms also exhibit positive stock price reactions to initial dividend 
announcements. In addition, the clean sample excludes the announcements of 
dividend initiations contaminated by other events reported in the WSJI within the 
(-3 ,+  3) period. Therefore, this finding is not driven by other announcements such 
as earnings reports.
Figure 1 depicts the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR(_135T) ) against the day relative to the announcement. Documented are four 
time series curves corresponding to four different samples: NYSE/ASE & 
NASDAQ complete sample, NYSE/ASE & NASDAQ clean sample, NYSE/ASE 
clean sample, and NYSE/ASE complete sample. There is a big jump in CAR at 
the announcement indicating that significant information is released at the 
announcement. However, there seems to be a gradual stock price build-up during 
the pre-announcement period. On average, the dividend initiating firms outperform 
the market by about 10% from day -135 to day -5. Although this result is not 
reported by previous studies, it is consistent with the evidence shown by Healy and 
Palepu (1988) that dividend initiating firms experience earnings increases one year 
before the announcement.
Table 9 contains the outcomes of cross-sectional regressions with the two-day 
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32
Table 9
Estimated coefficients from cross-sectional regression of dividend initiation announcement 
two-day cumulative abnormal returns (C A R ^.^) on dividend yield (DIVYIELDj), firm size 
(FIRMSIZEj), and two-day cumulative abnormal trading volume (CAV|
The clean sample excludes initiation announcements contaminated by other WSJI events 
within the (-3,+ 3) window while the complete sample does not. The t-statistics are given 
in parentheses.
Equations3
Variables 1 2 3 4
Panel A: Complete NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ sample
Constant -0.0054 0.2915** 0.0142** 0.0843







Adjusted R2 0.1538 0.0682 0.1365 0.2415
F-stat 69.527** 45.818** 73.248** 32.206**
Sample size 378 613 458 295
Panel B: Clean NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ sample
Constant 0.0010 0.2467** 0.0135** 0.0864







Adjusted R2 0.1186 0.0600 0.1491 0.3047
F-stat 34.760** 26.606** 52.181** 28.464**




Variables 1 2 3 4
Panel C: Complete NYSE/ASE sample
Constant -0.0070 0.3127** 0.0146** 0.0815







Adjusted R2 0.2014 0.0875 0.1241 0.2363
F-stat 46.634** 26.409** 38.540** 19.666**
Sample size 182 266 266 182
Panel D: Clean NYSE/ASE sample
Constant -0.0130 0.3419** 0.0153* 0.0789







Adjusted R2 0.3143 0.0980 0.1789 0.3467
F-stat 51.424** 18.594** 36.296** 20.455**
Sample size 111 163 163 111
•Significant at the 5% level. *‘Significant at the 1% level.
aThe equation is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The use of weighted least
squares (WLS) with the s2, firm i’s estimated variance of the error term in the market
model, as the weighing factor does not change the conclusion.
bDIVYIELDj is firm i’s expected annualized dividend yield.
cFIRMSIZEj is firm i’s natural logarithm of the market equity value on day -15.
dI first normalize the trading volume for firm i on day t as follows:
V|, = In [0.001275 + 100 x (shares of firm i traded on day t) /  (shares outstanding for firm 
i on day t)]. Then the two-day cumulative abnormal trading volume for firm i is estimated 
as follows:
CAVi(.10) = S°t=_1 (Vit - Vj), where Vj is the mean of Vit for firm i over the estimation 
period (-135,-16).
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expected annualized dividend yield, total market value of equity, and mean-adjusted 
two-day cumulative abnormal trading volume. I find a positive and significant 
estimated coefficient for the dividend yield in every regression specification. This 
strong positive relationship between the size of dividend and the stock price 
reaction is consistent with Asquith and Mullins (1983).
The evidence also supports the hypothesized firm size effect suggested by 
Bajaj and Vijh (1990). The estimated coefficient of the firm size variable is 
negative (an expected sign) in every regression and is significant in every univariate 
regression. However, the explanatory power of the firm size is not as strong as that 
of the dividend yield. In every univariate regression on firm size, the intercept is 
always significant and the adjusted R2 and the F statistic are always lower than 
those in the univariate regression on dividend yield. Moreover, the estimated 
coefficient for firm size becomes less significant in every multivariate regression.
Finally, I find a positive and significant estimated coefficient for the 
abnormal trading volume variable in every regression. This finding is consistent 
with that of Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson (1986). They conclude that volume 
increases primarily in response to the positive signal conveyed by dividend 
initiations.
Another piece of evidence to support the firm size effect can be found by 
comparing CAR(.10) and firm size in the CRSP sample (table 2 and tables 5 through 
8) with those in the I /B /E /S  sample (table 4). Unlike the smaller CRSP firms, the 
larger I /B /E /S  firms are, by definition, more closely followed by analysts. The
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stock market will therefore be less sensitive to any information release from 
I /B /E /S  firms.
Tables 10 through 13 report the monthly forecast revision of EPS by analysts 
over the 13 month period surrounding the initial dividend announcement month. 
Tables 10 and 11 demonstrate revisions of forecasts for the current fiscal year while 
tables 12 and 13 are for the following fiscal year forecasts. The samples used in 
tables 10 and 12 are the complete I /B /E /S  samples while in tables 11 and 13 are 
the clean I /B /E /S  samples which exclude firms with any contaminating events 
within the (-15,+15) window. Hence, results from tables 11 and 13 are not induced 
by events such as earnings announcements.
Section 3.2. mentions that the use of the unadjusted raw forecast revision in 
I /B /E /S  may cause an optimism bias and an autocorrelation bias. Both biases 
work against finding positive forecast revisions. Despite these potential biases, I 
find positive and significant (at the 5% level) raw forecast revisions during the 
announcement month, with the exception of table 13. This evidence is consistent 
with the hypothesis that dividend initiation announcements signal positive 
information about firms’ earnings prospects and that analysts revise their earnings 
forecasts upward based on this new information.
For the clean I /B /E /S  sample, two reasons may explain month 0’s 
insignificant raw revisions in the next year’s earnings forecasts (table 13). First, 
analysts may be reluctant to make changes in their longer-term forecasts. Second, 
panel D of the table 4 shows that the CAR(_10) for this particular sample is -0.2%.
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Table 10
Analysts’ current fiscal year earnings per share raw and abnormal forecast revisions, over
the 13-month period centered around dividend initiation announcements, for firms traded
on NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ with forecast data available from I /B /E /S  tape.
Raw revisions are calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts 
divided by the stock price 15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions 
are calculated using a fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that 
the mean (median) of raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon 

























-6 -0.00039 0.00000 23.1 -0.00165 -0.00063 39.5 147
(0.800) (0.621) [30.6] (0.329) (0.007) [60.5]
-5 -0.00028 0.00000 27.4 -0.00155 -0.00014 47.1 157
(0.798) (0.186) [19.1] (0.187) (0.530) [52.9]
-4 0.00330 0.00000 23.0 0.00354 -0.00028 41.6 161
(0.113) (0.210) [21.1] (0.108) (0.701) [58.4]
-3 0.00092 0.00000 28.0 0.00048 -0.00027 42.9 168
(0.393) (0.307) [20.8] (0.691) (0.649) [57.1]
-2 -0.00009 0.00000 33.7 -0.00043 -0.00010 46.7 169
(0.942) (0.035) [20.7] (0.736) (0.465) [53.3]
-1 0.00056 0.00000 27.3 -0.00005 -0.00026 43.8 176
(0.456) (0.183) [19.9] (0.961) (0.527) [56.3]
0 0.00455” 0.00000” 35.5 0.00377” -0.00007 48.1 183
(0.000) (0.000) [16.9] (0.001) (0.075) [51.9]
+ 1 0.00213 0.00000 32.2 0.00084 -0.00099** 36.1 180
(0.062) (0.217) [25.0] (0.532) (0.005) [63.9]
+ 2 0.00142* 0.00000* 30.8 -0.00012 -0.00074” 35.7 182
(0.015) (0.019) [18.7] (0.856) (0.004) [64.3]
+ 3 0.00082 0.00000 26.1 -0.00093 -0.00057** 35.6 180
(0.383) (0.303) [20.6] (0.367) (0.001) [64.4]
+ 4 0.00085 0.00000 30.2 -0.00094 -0.00058** 40.7 182
(0.262) (0.173) [24.2] (0.239) (0.003) [59.3]
+ 5 0.00058 0.00000 29.6 -0.00041 -0.00034 40.2 179
(0.409) (0.544) [27.4] (0.601) (0.135) [59.8]
+ 6 -0.00134 0.00000 22.2 -0.00198* -0.00062** 34.7 176
(0.096) (0.085) [33.5] (0.037) (0.000) [65.3]
*’ Significant at the 1% level. ’Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 11
Analysts’ current fiscal year earnings per share raw and abnormal forecast revisions, over
the 13-month period centered around "clean" dividend initiation announcements, for firms
traded on NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ with forecast data available from I /B /E /S  tape.
Raw revisions are calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts 
divided by the stock price 15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions 
are calculated using a fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that 
the mean (median) of raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon 

























-6 -0.00101 0.00000 21.4 -0.00192 -0.00102* 35.7 56
(0.571) (0.475) [32.1] (0.357) (0.048) [64.3]
-5 0.00151 0.00000 20.7 -0.00004 -0.00038 43.1 58
(0.099) (0.080) [12.1] (0.976) (0.590) [56.9]
-4 0.00665 0.00000 19.7 0.00555 -0.00093 31.1 61
(0.216) (0.612) [23.0] (0.312) (0.107) [68.9]
-3 -0.00014 0.00000 25.0 -0.00190 -0.00063 42.2 64
(0.939) (0.971) [25.0] (0.357) (0.265) [57.8]
-2 -0.00033 0.00000 25.8 -0.00118 -0.00040 39.4 66
(0.706) (0.863) [21.2] (0.456) (0.189) [60.6]
-1 0.00149 0.00000 26.1 0.00043 -0.00026 44.9 69
(0.129) (0.194) [18.8] (0.757) (0.965) [55.1]
0 0.00319** 0.00000** 30.6 0.00198 -0.00009 47.2 72
(0.009) (0.009) [15.3] (0.273) (0.586) [52.8]
+ 1 -0.00107 0.00000 20.8 -0.00206 -0.00062** 33.3 72
(0.220) (0.444) [20.8] (0.072) (0.005) [66.7]
+ 2 0.00247 0.00000 31.9 0.00178 -0.00019 41.7 72
(0.062) (0.063) [18.1] (0.197) (0.722) [58.3]
+ 3 0.00229 0.00000 29.6 0.00109 -0.00037 38.0 71
(0.281) (0.200) [19.7] (0.620) (0.388) [62.0]
+ 4 0.00032 0.00000 26.8 -0.00103 -0.00037 40.8 71
(0.777) (0.848) [26.8] (0.284) (0.065) [59.2]
+ 5 0.00158 0.00000 32.9 0.00076 -0.00012 47.1 70
(0.259) (0.502) [27.1] (0.610) (0.993) [52.9]
+ 6 -0.00153 0.00000 27.1 -0.00278 -0.00070* 34.8 69
(0.396) (0.537) [30.4] (0.203) (0.017) [65.2]
*’ Significant at the 1% level. ’ Significant at the 5 % level.
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Table 12
Analysts’ following fiscal year earnings per share raw and abnormal forecast revisions, over
the 13-month period centered around dividend initiation announcements, for firms traded
on NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ with forecast data available from I /B /E /S  tape.
Raw revisions are calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts 
divided by the stock price 15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions 
are calculated using a fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that 
the mean (median) of raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon 

























-6 -0.00077 0.00000 27.5 -0.00031 0.00040 54.9 102
(0.527) (0.993) [23.5] (0.810) (0.566) [44.1]
-5 -0.00148 0.00000 21.7 -0.00066 0.00041 55.7 115
(0.469) (0.909) [19.1] (0.765) (0.570) [44.3]
-4 -0.00053 0.00000 16.1 0.00105 -0.00006 47.5 118
(0.552) (0.216) [22.0] (0.385) (0.467) [52.5]
-3 -0.00070 0.00000 19.5 0.00034 0.00005 51.2 123
(0.476) (0.620) [19.5] (0.736) (0.650) [47.2]
-2 0.00056 0.00000 28.9 0.00138 0.00008 52.1 121
(0.458) (0.201) [19.0] (0.160) (0.122) [47.1]
-1 -0.00112 0.00000 25.6 -0.00046 0.00002 50.4 121
(0.136) (0.841) [23.1] (0.525) (0.669) [48.8]
0 0.00312* 0. 00000* 30.3 0.00383* 0.00026* 55.7 122
(0.042) (0.049) [22.1] (0.017) (0.047) [43.4]
+ 1 0.00047 0.00000 26.7 0.00010 -0.00010 46.6 116
(0.748) (0.781) [22.4] (0.954) (0.602) [51.7]
+ 2 -0.00057 0.00000 29.8 -0.00128 -0.00045 41.9 124
(0.630) (0.494) [20.2] (0.333) (0.165) [57.3]
+ 3 0.00138 0.00000 21.4 0.00106 -0.00006 47.6 126
(0.266) (0.514) [23.0] (0.411) (0.844) [51.6]
+ 4 0.00079 0.00000 30.6 0.00005 -0.00016 45.2 124
(0.375) (0.652) [23.4] (0.961) (0.342) [54.8]
+ 5 0.00140 0.00000 35.2 0.00130 -0.00004 49.6 125
(0.205) (0.110) [22.4] (0.279) (0.773) [50.4]
+ 6 0.00131 0.00000 26.4 0.00084 -0.00020 47.2 125
(0.239) (0.521) [24.8] (0.505) (0.429) [52.8]
*‘Significant at the 1% level. ‘ Significant at the 5 % level.
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Table 13
Analysts’ following fiscal year earnings per share raw and abnormal forecast revisions, over
the 13-month period centered around "clean" dividend initiation announcements, for firms
traded on NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ with forecast data available from I /B /E /S  tape.
Raw revisions are calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts 
divided by the stock price 15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions 
are calculated using a fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that 
the mean (median) of raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon 

























-6 0.00056 0.00000 20.6 0.00149 0.00081 67.6 34
(0.692) (1.000) [20.6] (0.321) (0.115) [32.4]
-5 0.00300 0.00000 18.6 0.00378 0.00063 62.8 43
(0.312) (0.720) [16.3] (0.312) (0.398) [37.2]
-4 0.00099 0.00000 16.7 0.00079 0.00008 52.1 48
(0.521) (0.980) [16.7] (0.630) (0.762) [47.9]
-3 -0.00066 0.00000 13.0 -0.00138 -0.00002 43.5 46
(0.640) (0.190) [23.9] (0.350) (0.272) [52.2]
-2 0.00016 0.00000 20.0 0.00049 0.00004 52.0 50
(0.886) (0.869) [20.0] (0.720) (0.699) [46.0]
-1 -0.00164 0.00000 25.0 -0.00137 0.00024 52.1 48
(0.219) (0.798) [14.6] (0.322) (0.700) [45.8]
0 0.00120 0.00000 25.5 0.00203 -0.00013 47.1 51
(0.410) (0.908) [31.4] (0.175) (0.426) [51.0]
+ 1 0.00288 0.00000 19.2 0.00321 0.00000 48.1 52
(0.343) (0.327) [17.3] (0.218) (0.415) [48.1]
+ 2 -0.00192 0.00000 30.2 -0.00305 -0.00045 43.4 53
(0.407) (0.708) [20.8] (0.252) (0.255) [54.7]
+ 3 0.00311 0.00000 24.5 0.00261 0.00000 49.1 53
(0.268) (0.297) [22.6] (0.365) (0.964) [49.1]
+ 4 0.00129 0.00000 26.4 0.00031 -0.00005 45.3 53
(0.330) (0.784) [20.8] (0.840) (0.481) [54.7]
+ 5 0.00220 0.00000 34.6 0.00145 0.00021 53.8 52
(0.309) (0.558) [28.8] (0.517) (0.957) [46.2]
+ 6 0.00219 0.00000 24.4 0.00115 -0.00036 40.4 47
(0.405) (0.873) [31.9] (0.706) (0.244) [59.6]
‘ ‘ Significant at the 1% level. ‘Significant at the 5 % level.
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The information released by the dividend initiation for this particular sample is not 
significant.
On the other hand, the results from the abnormal forecast revision are less 
consistent. For example, table 11 shows an insignificant announcement month 
abnormal forecast revision for the current year forecast clean I /B /E /S  sample while 
table 10 shows a positive and significant (for the student-t test) abnormal forecast 
revision for the complete sample.
My explanation is that the I /B /E /S  sample may not be subject to the 
overoptimism bias. Brous and Kini (1993) in their tables 5 and 6 show that for a 
sample of tender offer target firms, the mean of raw forecast revisions in almost any 
month surrounding the announcement is negative. However, this overoptimism bias 
does not seem to exist in my tables 10 to 13. For example, table 10 shows that the 
mean of raw forecast revision is positive in nine out of 13 months. Therefore, any 
attempt to correct for this bias may introduce noise into the estimates.
Finally, I investigate the association between the raw or abnormal forecast 
revisions and the announcement period abnormal returns by conducting the 
following cross-sectional regressions:
CARi,(-i,o) = b0 + bjFRjo and 
CARj,(.ito) = b0 + b 1A PRij0.
The CARi(.10) is the two-day cumulative abnormal return for firm i. The FR i0 
(AFRi0) is the announcement month raw (abnormal) forecast revision for firm i. 
The coefficient b, is expected to be positive. Table 14 contains the estimation
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Table 14
Estimated coefficients from cross-sectional regression of dividend initiation announcement 
two-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARi(,10}) on announcement month raw forecast 
revision (FRi0) or on announcement month abnormal forecast revision (AFRi0).
The regression is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). Raw revisions are 
calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts divided by the stock price 
15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions are calculated using a 
fourth-order moving average model. The t-statistics are given in parentheses.
Equations
Variables la 2a 3b 4b
Panel A: Current year EPS forecast revisions
Constant 0.0156** 0.0159** 0.0082 0.0079





Adjusted R2 -0.0046 -0.0016 -0.0015 0.0387
F-stat 0.169 0.710 0.893 3.855
Sample size 183 183 72 72
Panel B: Following year EPS forecast revisions
Constant 0.0071 0.0071 -0.0025 -0.0028





Adjusted R2 -0.0025 -0.0047 -0.0107 -0.0120
F-stat 0.702 0.431 0.472 0.407
Sample size 122 122 51 51
•Significant at the 5% level.
*‘Significant at the 1% level.
aUse complete sample which includes all initiation announcements.
bUse clean sample which excludes initiation announcements contaminated by other WSJI
events within the (-15, +15) window.
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results. None of the estimated bj turns out to be significantly differently from zero. 
This result seems to be inconsistent with that of Brous (1992) whose table 9 reports 
a positive and marginally significant estimated coefficient for A FR i 0. However, his 
regression does not work too well either. For example, his adjusted R 2 is as small 
as 0.01.
Table 10 shows that 35.5% (16.9%) of announcement month raw forecast 
revisions are positive (negative) for the complete sample of current year forecast. 
For the clean sample table 11 indicates that 30.6% (15.3%) of announcement 
month raw forecast revisions are positive (negative). One of the interesting tasks 
is therefore to find the driving forces behind these positive, negative, or zero 
revisions. Although table 14 suggests no significant linear relationship between 
earnings forecast revision and stock price reaction, it does not rule out the 
possibility of a non-linear relationship nor does it explore other potential factors 
such as seasonality, dividend yield, and firm size.
Table 15 examines the effect of seasonality on forecast revisions by 
comparing announcement month frequency distributions among the positive, zero, 
or negative forecast revision subsamples. It has been well documented that stock 
returns exhibit certain seasonalities. However, the results from table 15 do not 
suggest that any particular month is systematically driving the positive or negative 
revisions.
Tables 16 and 17 compare the summary statistics of market equity value, 
two-day cumulative abnormal return, and annualized dividend yield among the
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Table 15
Relationship between the announcing month frequency distribution and the current fiscal 
year EPS raw forecast revision during the announcement month (FRi0).
The clean sample excludes initiation announcements contaminated by other WSJI events 
within the (-15, +15) window while the complete sample does not.
Complete sample Clean sample
FRii0 > 0 FRi,o = 0 FR-i.o o FRi.o > 0 FRi,o = 0 FRii0 < 0
Month % % % % % %
Jan 6.2 10.3 3.2 4.5 7.7
Feb 15.4 4.6 3.2 9.1
Mar 12.3 9.2 12.9 13.6 12.8 27.3
Apr 9.2 12.6 9.7 9.1 7.7 9.1
May 13.8 8.0 6.5 9.1 7.7 9.1
Jun 1.5 9.2 9.7 4.5 10.3 9.1
Jul 7.7 8.0 3.2 9.1 7.7
Aug 4.6 9.2 9.7 9.1 7.7 9.1
Sep 7.7 3.4 9.7 9.1 7.7 18.2
Oct 7.7 11.5 9.7 10.3
Nov 12.3 8.0 19.4 22.7 10.3 18.2
Dec 1.5 5.7 3.2 10.3
N 65 87 31 22 39 11
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Table 16
Complete sample cross-sectional relationship between the analysts’ current fiscal year EPS 
raw forecast revision during the announcement month (FRi0) and three firm characteristic 
variables: market equity value, two-day cumulative abnormal return (CARi(40)), and 
expected annualized dividend yield.
The complete sample does not exclude initiation announcements contaminated by other 
WSJI events within the (-15,+15) window. Raw revisions are calculated as the difference 
between consecutive monthly forecasts divided by the stock price 15 days before the 
announcement.
N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
Panel A: FRi0 > 0 subsample
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 65 168.710 202.190 7.622 94.910 828.790
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
CARi(.10) OF ANNOUNCING 65 0.018 0.057 -0.100 0.012 0.241
'FIRM
EXPECTED ANNUALIZED 44 0.018 0.012 0.004 0.015 0.064
DIVIDEND YIELD
Panel B: FRi0 = 0 subsample
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 87 126.520 464.880 4.454 40.347 4273.200
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
CARi(.10) OF ANNOUNCING 87 0.012 0.048 -0.106 0.009 0.148
' f ir m
EXPECTED ANNUALIZED 59 0.021 0.012 0.003 0.017 0.050
DIVIDEND YIELD
Panel C: FRi0 < 0 subsample
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 31 115.070 112.370 11.972 79.025 587.570
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
CARi(.10) OF ANNOUNCING 31 0.018 0.055 -0.132 0.013 0.115
' f ir m




Clean sample cross-sectional relationship between the analysts’ current fiscal year EPS raw 
forecast revision during the announcement month (FRi0) and three firm characteristic 
variables: market equity value, two-day cumulative abnormal return (CARi(_10)), and 
expected annualized dividend yield.
The clean sample excludes initiation announcements contaminated by other WSJI events 
within the (-15,+ 15) window. Raw revisions are calculated as the difference between 
consecutive monthly forecasts divided by the stock price 15 days before the announcement.
N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
Panel A: FRi0 > 0 subsample
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 22 127.670 132.320 25.274 100.530 559.290
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
CARi(.10) OF ANNOUNCING 22 0.005 0.035 -0.060 0.002 0.072
' f ir m
EXPECTED ANNUALIZED 17 0.022 0.014 0.010 0.017 0.064
DIVIDEND YIELD
Panel B: FRi0 = 0 subsample
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 39 65.374 66.819 9.056 36.853 307.780
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
CARj(.10) OF ANNOUNCING 39 0.009 0.050 -0.077 0.005 0.148
' f ir m
EXPECTED ANNUALIZED 28 0.022 0.012 0.003 0.022 0.045
DIVIDEND YIELD
Panel C: FRi0 < 0 subsample
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 11 107.430 96.520 14.989 62.606 301.370
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
CARi(_10) OF ANNOUNCING 11 0.001 0.059 -0.132 0.003 0.079
'FIRM
EXPECTED ANNUALIZED 7 0.022 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.047
DIVIDEND YIELD
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positive, zero, or negative forecast revision subsamples. The positive forecast 
revisions are expected to be associated with smaller firms, more pronounced stock 
price reactions, and larger dividend yields. However, the evidence provided here 
is not consistent with the predicted relationship.
2.5. Conclusion
This chapter explores the dividend information hypothesis by examining 
analyst earnings forecast revisions as well as stock price reactions at the 
announcement of dividend initiation. I find that stock price reaction is positively 
related to the size of dividend and the trading volume and is inversely related to 
the firm size. This evidence is consistent with the dividend information hypothesis 
and the findings of Asquith and Mullins (1983), Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson 
(1986), and Bajaj and Vijh (1990).
In sum, literature suggests that dividend initiations convey favorable 
information about firms’ earnings prospects. I hypothesize that analysts will act 
upon this new information and thereby revise their earnings forecasts upward. I 
test this hypothesis using the I /B /E /S  earnings forecast data. In general, I 
demonstrate a positive forecast revision during the dividend initiation 
announcement month. This evidence parallels that of Ofer and Siegel (1987) and 
is contrasted with that of Lang and Litzenberger (1989), who report an insignificant 
forecast revision around the announcement of dividend changes.
Chapter 3
Intra-Industry Information Transfers Associated with Dividend Initiation
Announcements
3.1. Introduction
T h i s  c h a p t e r  a d d r e s s e s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  d i v i d e n d  i n i t i a t i o n  
c o n v e y s  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  a f f e c t s  o t h e r  f i r m s  w i t h i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  I  
i n v e s t i g a t e  s t o c k  p r i c e  r e a c t i o n s  a n d  a n a l y s t  e a r n i n g s  f o r e c a s t  r e v i s i o n s  f o r  a  g r o u p  
o f  i n d u s t r y  r i v a l s  a s  f i r m s  a n n o u n c e  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  d i v i d e n d  p a y m e n t s .  B y  
d o c u m e n t i n g  t h e s e  t w o  t y p e s  o f  e m p i r i c a l  e v i d e n c e ,  t h i s  s t u d y  e n h a n c e s  o u r  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  i n v e s t o r s  i n f e r  f r o m  d i v i d e n d  
i n i t i a t i o n  a n n o u n c e m e n t s .
T h e  e m p i r i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e  o n  d i v i d e n d  i n i t i a t i o n s  i s  i n  g e n e r a l  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  h y p o t h e s i s .  H o w e v e r ,  l i t t l e  r e s e a r c h  h a s  b e e n  c o n d u c t e d  o n  t h e  
i s s u e  o f  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  d i v i d e n d  i n i t i a t i o n  a n n o u n c e m e n t s  h a v e  i n t r a - i n d u s t i y  
e f f e c t s  o n  r i v a l  f i r m s .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  r e s e a r c h  d o e s  n o t  r e v e a l  h o w  m u c h  o f  t h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h e  d i v i d e n d  i n i t i a t i o n  a n n o u n c e m e n t  i s  i n d u s t r y - c o m m o n  a n d  h o w  
m u c h  i s  f i r m - s p e c i f i c ,  n o r  d o e s  i t  s u g g e s t  i f  c o m p e t i t o r s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y  l o s e  f r o m  t h e  
g o o d  p r o s p e c t s  o f  d i v i d e n d  i n i t i a t i n g  f i r m s .
T w o  s t u d i e s  o f f e r  i n d i r e c t  e v i d e n c e  o n  t h i s  i s s u e .  F i r s t ,  t h e  m o d e l  b y  M a r s h  
a n d  M e r t o n  ( 1 9 8 7 )  a r g u e s  t h a t  f i r m s  m a y  c h a n g e  d i v i d e n d s  f o r  r e a s o n s  o t h e r  t h a n  
t o  s i g n a l  f i r m - s p e c i f i c  i n f o r m a t i o n .  I n  t h e i r  v i e w ,  f i r m s  m a y  c a l i b r a t e  t h e i r  d i v i d e n d  
p o l i c i e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e i r  p e e r  f i r m s .  H e n c e ,  w e  m a y  o b s e r v e  c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l  
d e p e n d e n c e  i n  d i v i d e n d  c h a n g e s .  T h i s  c o n t r a s t s  w i t h  A s q u i t h  a n d  M u l l i n s  ( 1 9 8 3 )
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in that firms may initiate dividends for reasons other than to establish a signaling 
mechanism. Second, the evidence proposed by Healy and Palepu (1988) suggests 
that dividend-initiating firms experience higher earnings growth in their dividend- 
initiating year than do their industry rivals. This finding tends to support traditional 
signaling models [e.g., John and Williams (1985); Miller and Rock (1985)], in which 
better firms try to distinguish themselves via higher dividends.
Literature on the intra-industry effect suggests three types of industry rival 
reactions, depending on the external nature of the information released from the 
initiation announcement. If the information has an industry-common component, 
rivals may react positively. If the information is entirely firm-specific, no reaction 
will be detected for rivals. Alternatively, rivals may react negatively if the 
information reflects their worsening competitive positions. Next, I will examine 
these three types of rival reactions in detail.
The information conveyed by dividend initiation announcements may be 
relevant for rivals in three ways. First, as firms in an industry are likely to compete 
in the same product markets and use the same resource markets, many common 
factors underlie their values. Thus, the information inferred from the 
announcement may reflect economic conditions facing the industry as a whole. As 
soon as the market perceives the positive information regarding the industry-wide 
components of cash flows, the market’s expectation of the rivals’ profitability will 
increase. Consequently, a positive stock price reaction for rivals is expected. Lang 
and Stulz (1992) refer to this as a contagion intra-industry effect.
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Second, dividend initiating events may convey firm-specific information with 
few consequences for rivals. The prediction that rival firms are unaffected by 
dividend initiation announcements serves as the null hypothesis for this study.
Third, the signaling theory of Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973) implies a 
rival reaction with a direction opposite to that of the announcing firm. Investors 
who are initially unable to distinguish between low-quality and high-quality firms 
will price shares by averaging values across all firms. Once the dividend initiation 
decision becomes public, the market will react favorably to the positive information 
from this "good" firm. As a result, the rest of firms in the industry will be identified 
as "lemons" and should exhibit negative price reactions. Lang and Stulz (1992) call 
this phenomenon a competitive intra-industry effect because the information reflects 
a change in the information about the competitive balance within the industry.
The intra-industry effect has become the focus of an increasing number of 
studies in recent years. The following studies report a significant positive intra­
industry information transfer. Hence, these managerial decisions seem to convey 
industry-common information. Foster (1981) illustrates that an earnings release by 
a firm that has a positive (negative) impact on its own stock price also has a 
positive (negative) impact on stock prices of its industry rivals. Similar results are 
obtained for management earnings forecasts by Baginski (1987). Slovin, Sushka, 
and Bendeck (1991) demonstrate significant and positive announcement effects on 
stock prices for industry rivals of going-private firms. Lang and Stulz (1992) find 
that on average bankruptcy announcements significantly decrease competing firms’
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stock prices. Szewczyk (1992) shows significantly negative abnormal returns of 
nonannouncing rivals upon announcements of common stock, convertible debt, and 
straight debt public offerings.
In contrast, Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1992) document insignificant 
intra-industiy effects for seasoned equity issues of industrial firms. Hertzel (1991) 
also fails to detect significant rival stock price performance for tender offer stock 
repurchase announcements. Therefore, these announcements seem to convey firm- 
specific information.
As for the hypothesized competitive intra-industry effect, Lang and Stulz 
(1992) identify some supporting evidence from their examination of bankruptcy 
announcements. Although the contagion intra-industry effect is dominant in the 
whole sample, nonbankrupt rival firms in a subsample of less competitive industries 
with low leverage experience positive abnormal returns. Therefore, the competitive 
effect is more pronounced in this subsample.
To test the external nature of the information revealed by dividend 
initiations, two lines of investigation are conducted here. One analyzes the effects 
of announcements of initial dividends on the stock prices of industry rival firms. 
A nother examines whether analysts revise their earnings forecasts for rivals after 
a dividend initiation announcement. Failure to find significant abnormal returns 
and significant forecast revisions for industrial rivals shall indicate that the initiation 
announcement signals firm-specific information only.
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In addition, I explore the relationship between the rivals’ reaction and the 
market/economy condition. The favorable information revealed by dividend 
initiation is likely to be more (less) informative when the m arket/economy is 
pessimistic (optimistic). Therefore, if a firm initiates dividend when there is a bear 
(bull) market or the economy is in the recession (growing) cycle, the hypothesized 
intra-industry effect should be more (less) pronounced. In order to test this 
hypothesis I first break down the rival sample according to the market/economy 
condition in the announcement month. Then I study the stock price reactions and 
the earnings forecast revisions for each subsample.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. 
Section 3 discusses the methodology. Section 4 consists of a discussion of results. 
Section 5 gives a conclusion.
3.2. Data
The dividend initiating firm’s industry is identified using the four-digit SIC 
code available from CRSP tape at the announcement. Nonannouncing rivals are 
defined as firms that share the same SIC code with the announcing firms at the 
announcement. The 1992 CRSP manual indicates that SIC codes are more 
complete in the NYSE/ASE file than in the NASDAQ file. Therefore, only the 
NYSE/ASE firms are included in this study. In addition, three more restrictions 
are imposed. First, the rivals must have non-missing returns on both day -1  and 
day 0. Second, the stock price and the number of outstanding shares on day -15
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for each rival must be available from the CRSP tape. Third, there must be at least 
60 non-missing returns during the estimation period (-135,-16).
After matching 266 announcing firms from the complete NYSE/ASE CRSP 
sample (in Chapter 2) with the CRSP NYSE/ASE file and satisfying these three 
criteria, I generate a complete full sample for the study of rivals’ stock price 
reaction. This sample includes 236 announcing firms with corresponding 3540 rivals 
in 145 industries. Furthermore, I form a dominant firm subsample by including 
announcing firms and nonannouncing rivals where each is among the six largest 
firms with respect to their market equity values within the industry. This criterion 
results in 487 rivals corresponding to 142 announcing firms in 113 industries. Foster 
(1981) argues that there tends to be greater similarity among the larger firms in the 
same industry. Larger firms typically sell to the national m arket while smaller firms 
tend to serve the regional market. Hence, this subsample may more clearly reflect 
the intra-industry effect.
A clean sample is also formed by excluding rivals with corresponding initial 
dividend announcements contaminated by other WSJI events within the (-3 ,+ 3) 
window. The clean full sample has 2395 rivals corresponding to 146 announcing 
firms in 100 industries. The clean dominant firm subsample consists of 302 rivals 
associated with 86 announcing firms in 76 industries.
The frequency distribution and the descriptive statistics for these samples are 
reported in tables 18 and 19, respectively. There is a significant concentration of 
dividend initiations during the period of 1973-1977 reported in table 18. Little
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Table 18
Frequency distribution of the dividend initiation announcements made by NYSE/ASE firms 
with their corresponding rivals’ stock return data available from CRSP tape.
The dominant firm subsample includes only the rivals and announcing firms where each is 
among the six largest firms in the industry. The clean sample excludes rivals and their 
corresponding initiation announcements with other WSJI events within the (-3, + 3) window.
Full sample Dominant firm subsample
Complete Clean Complete Clean
Panel A: By announcement year
Year Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
1968 2 0.8 1 0.7
1969 2 0.8 1 0.7 1 0.7 1 1.2
1970 2 0.8 1 0.7 2 1.4 1 1.2
1971 8 3.4 4 2.7 6 4.2 2 2.3
1972 10 4.2 6 4.1 8 5.6 5 5.8
1973 25 10.6 21 14.4 15 10.6 12 14.0
1974 15 6.4 9 6.2 9 6.3 4 4.7
1975 27 11.4 16 11.0 18 12.7 9 10.5
1976 36 15.3 22 15.1 20 14.1 10 11.6
1977 25 10.6 16 11.0 14 9.9 10 11.6
1978 9 3.8 4 2.7 3 2.1 2 2.3
1979 7 3.0 2 1.4 2 1.4 1 1.2
1980 8 3.4 6 4.1 4 2.8 3 3.5
1981 3 1.3 3 2.1 1 0.7 1 1.2
1982 5 2.1 2 1.4 3 2.1 2 2.3
1983 5 2.1 4 2.7 3 2.1 2 2.3
1984 5 2.1 2 1.4 5 3.5 2 2.3
1985 6 2.5 4 2.7 2 1.4 2 2.3
1986 4 1.7 2 1.4 4 2.8 2 2.3
1987 10 4.2 5 3.4 7 4.9 5 5.8
1988 5 2.1 4 2.7 4 2.8 3 3.5
1989 8 3.4 5 3.4 5 3.5 2 2.3
1990 2 0.8 2 1.4 1 0.7 1 1.2
1991 2 0.8 1 0.7 1 0.7 1 1.2
1992 5 2.1 4 2.7 3 2.1 3 3.5
Total 236 100.0 146 100.0 
(table con’d.)
142 100.0 86 100.0
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Full sample Dominant firm subsample
Complete Clean Complete Clean
Panel B: By announcement month
Month Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Jan 16 6.8 10 6.8 9 6.3 3 3.5
Feb 22 9.3 13 8.9 17 12.0 11 12.8
Mar 18 7.6 11 7.5 9 6.3 6 7.0
Apr 20 8.5 9 6.2 10 7.0 4 4.7
May 32 13.6 20 13.7 17 12.0 11 12.8
Jun 17 7.2 11 7.5 12 8.5 8 9.3
Jul 12 5.1 6 4.1 9 6.3 5 5.8
Aug 14 5.9 8 5.5 10 7.0 7 8.1
Sep 16 6.8 8 5.5 9 6.3 4 4.7
Oct 24 10.2 15 10.3 11 7.7 6 7.0
Nov 23 9.7 19 13.0 16 11.3 14 16.3
Dec 22 9.3 16 11.0 13 9.2 7 8.1
Total 236 100.0 146 100.0 142 100.0 86 100.0
Panel C: By announced dividend distribution frequency
Dividend Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Unspecified 70 29.7 43 29.5 39 27.5 22 25.6
Quarterly 119 50.4 77 52.7 77 54.2 50 58.1
Semi-annual 37 15.7 19 13.0 20 14.1 10 11.6
Annual 10 4.2 7 4.8 6 4.2 4 4.7
Total 236 100.0 146 100.0 142 100.0 86 100.0
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Table 19
Descriptive statistics for the study of rivals’ stock price reaction to dividend initiation 
announcements.
The clean sample excludes rivals and their corresponding initiation announcements 
contaminated by other WSJI events within the (-3,+ 3) window while the complete sample 
does not. The dominant firm subsample includes only the announcing firms and 
nonannouncing rivals where each is among the six largest firms in the industry.
N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
Panel A: Complete full sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 236 0.084 0.091 0.010 0.050 0.820
($)
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 236 64.115 117.340 1.298 23.115 828.790
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 145 1.628 1.433 1.000 1.000 12.000
PER SIC CODE
#  OF RIVALS PER 236 15.000 18.147 1.000 7.000 104.000
ANNOUNCEMENT
CARi(.10) OF ANNOUNCING 236 0.032 0.068 -0.095 0.016 0.290
’f ir m
Panel B: Clean full sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 146 0.079 0.078 0.010 0.050 0.640
($)
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 146 63.777 114.170 1.298 22.150 820.340
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 100 1.460 1.184 1.000 1.000 9.000
PER SIC CODE
#  OF RIVALS PER 146 16.404 19.562 1.000 8.000 104.000
ANNOUNCEMENT




N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
Panel C: Complete dominant firm subsample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 142 0.078 0.072 0.020 0.050 0.550
($)
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 142 79.219 144.780 1.298 25.965 828.790
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 113 1.257 0.531 1.000 1.000 3.000
PER SIC CODE
#  OF RIVALS PER 142 3.430 1.518 1.000 4.000 5.000
ANNOUNCEMENT
CARi( 10) OF ANNOUNCING 142 0.033 0.073 -0.095 0.015 0.290
’f ir m
Panel D: Clean dominant firm subsample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 86 0.073 0.062 0.020 0.050 0.350
($)
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 86 77.307 140.740 1.298 26.867 820.340
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 76 1.132 0.377 1.000 1.000 3.000
PER SIC CODE
#  OF RIVALS PER 86 3.512 1.577 1.000 4.000 5.000
ANNOUNCEMENT
CARi(.10) OF ANNOUNCING 86 0.033 0.072 -0.094 0.014 0.290
FIRM
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industry clustering among announcing firms is detected from table 19. Moreover, 
the average number of rivals per announcing firm is 15.0 (16.4) for the complete 
(clean) full sample. This number is similar to the mean of 13.0 reported by Hertzel 
(1991). The average announcing firm’s market equity value in the dominant firm 
subsample is, by construction, larger than that in the full sample. However, there 
does not seem to be any difference in the CAR(.1>0) between the two samples.
Matching the complete full sample of rivals with the I /B /E /S  database yields 
908 (685) nonannouncing rival firms with current (following) fiscal year EPS 
forecasts available in the dividend initiation announcement month. These 908 (685) 
firms are rivals to 120 (103) dividend initiating firms and belong to 80 (69) 
industries. The clean sample is created by excluding rivals with corresponding 
initiation announcements contaminated by other WSJI events within the (-15, +15) 
window. The clean sample for the current (following) year forecast includes 345 
(268) rivals corresponding to 38 (33) announcing firms in 33 (29) industries.
These samples are employed for examining analyst forecast revision for 
rivals. Table 20 reports the frequency distribution while table 21 shows the 
descriptive statistics of these samples. Table 20 seems to indicate a concentration 
of announcements in 1976 and 1977. Table 21 suggests that there is no significant 
industry selection bias in announcing firms.
3.3. Empirical Methods
For examining rivals’ stock price responses, I use standard event study 
methodology similar to the one discussed in chapter 2. I estimate the market model
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Table 20
Frequency distribution of the dividend initiation announcements made by NYSE/ASE firms 
with their corresponding rivals’ EPS forecast data available from I/B /E /S  tape.
The clean sample excludes rivals and their corresponding initiation announcements 
contaminated by other WSJI events within the (-15, +15) window while the complete sample 
does not.
Current year EPS forecast Following year EPS forecast
Complete Clean Complete Clean
Panel A: By announcement year
Year Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
1976 22 18.3 3 7.9 18 17.5 3 9.1
1977 20 16.7 7 18.4 15 14.6 5 15.2
1978 8 6.7 3 7.9 5 4.9 2 6.1
1979 6 5.0 5 4.9
1980 8 6.7 4 10.5 7 6.8 4 12.1
1981 2 1.7 1 2.6 2 1.9 1 3.0
1982 5 4.2 2 5.3 5 4.9 2 6.1
1983 5 4.2 5 4.9
1984 5 4.2 2 5.3 5 4.9 2 6.1
1985 6 5.0 2 5.3 6 5.8 2 6.1
1986 4 3.3 1 2.6 4 3.9 1 3.0
1987 9 7.5 2 5.3 8 7.8 1 3.0
1988 • 5 4.2 3 7.9 4 3.9 3 9.1
1989 7 5.8 4 10.5 7 6.8 4 12.1
1990 2 1.7 1 2.6 2 1.9 1 3.0
1991 2 1.7 1 2.6 2 1.9 1 3.0
1992 4 3.3 2 5.3 3 2.9 1 3.0
Total 120 100.0 38 100.0 103 100.0 33 100.0
(table con’d.)
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Current year EPS forecast Following year EPS forecast
Complete Clean Complete Clean
Panel B: By announcement month
Month Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Jan 7 5.8 3 7.9 7 6.8 3 9.1
Feb 11 9.2 2 5.3 10 9.7 2 6.1
Mar 9 7.5 8 7.8
Apr 9 7.5 3 7.9 5 4.9 1 3.0
May 23 19.2 8 21.1 16 15.5 7 21.2
Jun 11 9.2 5 13.2 9 8.7 4 12.1
Jul 3 2.5 3 2.9
Aug 6 5.0 1 2.6 6 5.8 1 3.0
Sep 8 6.7 3 7.9 7 6.8 3 9.1
Oct 11 9.2 2 5.3 11 10.7 2 6.1
Nov 13 10.8 5 13.2 13 12.6 5 15.2
Dec 9 7.5 6 15.8 8 7.8 5 15.2
Total 120 100.0 38 100.0 103 100.0 33 100.0
Panel C: By announced dividend distribution frequency
Dividend Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Unspecified 35 29.2 10 26.3 34 33.0 9 27.3
Quarterly 61 50.8 22 57.9 52 50.5 19 57.6
Semi-annual 17 14.2 3 7.9 10 9.7 2 6.1
Annual 7 5.8 3 7.9 7 6.8 3 9.1
Total 120 100.0 38 100.0 103 100.0 33 100.0
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Table 21
Descriptive statistics for the study of changes in analyst EPS forecasts for industry rivals in 
response to dividend initiation announcements.
The clean sample excludes rivals and their corresponding initiation announcements 
contaminated by other WSJI events within the (-15, +15) window while the complete sample 
does not.
N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
Panel A: Complete current year EPS forecast sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 120 0.087 0.111 0.010 0.050 0.820
($)
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 120 90.103 147.500 3.725 39.757 828.790
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 80 1.500 1.031 1.000 1.000 7.000
PER SIC CODE
#  OF RIVALS PER 120 7.567 11.544 1.000 4.000 84.000
ANNOUNCEMENT
CARj ( , 0) OF ANNOUNCING 120 0.025 0.063 -0.095 0.015 0.276
'FIRM
Panel B: Clean current year EPS forecast sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 38 0.061 0.049 0.020 0.050 0.300
($)
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 38 65.290 71.187 3.725 43.596 307.780
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 33 1.152 0.364 1.000 1.000 2.000
PER SIC CODE
#  OF RIVALS PER 38 9.079 17.640 1.000 3.000 84.000
ANNOUNCEMENT




N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
Panel C: Complete following year EPS forecast sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 103 0.089 0.119 0.010 0.050 0.820
($)
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 103 96.099 155.670 3.725 42.408 828.790
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 69 1.493 1.080 1.000 1.000 7.000
PER SIC CODE
# OF RIVALS PER 103 6.650 10.784 1.000 3.000 71.000
ANNOUNCEMENT
CARi(_10) OF ANNOUNCING 103 0.025 0.064 -0.095 0.016 0.276
'FIRM
Panel D: Clean following year EPS forecast sample
ANNOUNCED DIVIDEND 33 0.062 0.051 0.020 0.050 0.300
(S)
ANNOUNCING FIRM’S MKT 33 70.658 74.736 3.725 49.530 307.780
EQUITY VALUE (million $)
#  OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 29 1.138 0.351 1.000 1.000 2.000
PER SIC CODE
#  OF RIVALS PER 33 8.121 16.435 1.000 3.000 71.000
ANNOUNCEMENT
CARi(.,0) OF ANNOUNCING 33 0.020 0.064 -0.094 0.004 0.276
' f ir m
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using the equally-weighted CRSP market returns and the estimation period 
(-135,-16). Then I conduct statistical tests on the market model forecast errors. 
However, before the market model estimation I will employ three different methods 
of forming rival portfolios, as suggested by the literature [e.g. Slovin, Sushka, and 
Bendeck (1991)].
(1) Equally-weighted, event-pooled rival portfolios. Rivals are first pooled 
into different equally-weighted portfolios by the announcement. I then use portfolio 
returns rather than individual rivals’ returns to estimate the market model. This 
procedure can account for potential cross-correlation of returns induced by a 
clustering of industry observations in calendar time.
(2) Equally-weighted, all-rivals-included rival portfolio. All rivals have equal 
weight. The market model is estimated by using individual rivals’ returns. This 
method is used to examine whether the results from the event-pooled portfolio 
method are driven by a small number of events containing a small number of rivals.
(3) Single firm-size-matched rival. For each announcing firm, a single firm- 
size-matched rival is selected. The market model is then estimated using the 
selected rivals’ returns.
To investigate the effect of a dividend initiation announcement on analyst 
earnings forecasts for rivals, for each rival i in month t, I first calculate the monthly 
EPS raw and abnormal forecast revision, FR j, and AFRj t, as described in chapter 
2. Then I apply the three methods of forming rival portfolios to these FR ijt and
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AFRit. Finally, the statistical tests outlined in chapter 2 are performed to 
determine the significance of the raw or abnormal forecast revision for rivals.
For the analysis of the effect of market condition, I use the substantial 
up/average/substantial down market definition provided by Fabozzi and Francis 
(1977) to classify the bull/average/down market. If the announcement month 
market return based on the CRSP equally-weighted index is positive (negative) and 
its magnitude is larger than half of one standard deviation of the m arket returns 
measured over the 1968-1992 period, then this announcement is held in the bull 
(bear) market sample. Otherwise the announcement month is held in the average 
market sample.
For the study of the effect of business cycles, I use the definition of the 
business cycle provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
The announcement month is accordingly classified into the growing economy or the 
declining economy subsample.
3.4. Results
Table 22 reports the rivals’ stock price reaction. The two-day cumulative 
average abnormal return for rivals is always statistically insignificant regardless of 
the sample or the rival portfolio formation method used. This evidence suggests 
that dividend initiation announcements have no effect on their industry rivals and 
therefore convey firm-specific information only.
Tables 23 to 28 present the analysts’ raw and abnormal forecast revision of 
rival firms’ EPS over the 13 month period surrounding the initial dividend
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Table 22
Announcement period two-day cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR(.10)) for rivals
of dividend initiation firms traded on NYSE/ASE.
The clean sample excludes rivals and their corresponding initiation announcements 
contaminated by other WSJI events within the (-3,+ 3) window while the complete sample 
does not. The dominant firm subsample includes only the announcing firms and 





Positive Patell-Zd BW-T° BMP-Tf N
All3 -0.070
Panel A: Complete full sample 
47.3 0.06 -0.88 0.05 3540
Eventb 0.022 48.3 0.23 0.12 0.22 236
Size0 0.039 49.6 0.10 0.11 0.10 236
All3 -0.129
Panel B: Clean full sample 
46.7 -0.43 -1.29 -0.38 2395
Eventb 0.020 46.6 -0.25 0.09 -0.23 146
Size0 0.253 50.7 0.24 0.58 0.28 146
All3
Panel C: Complete dominant firm subsample 
0.017 48.0 1.09 0.08 1.11 487
Eventb 0.045 50.0 ' 0.37 0.16 0.39 142
Size0 0.206 51.4 0.43 0.44 0.45 142
All3 0.011
Panel D: Clean dominant firm subsample 
48.3 0.64 0.04 0.68 302
Eventb 0.017 48.8 -0.10 0.05 -0.11 86
Size0 0.102 51.2 -0.25 0.18 -0.30 86
3 All rivals that share the same four-digit SIC codes with the announcing firms are included. 
bEvent-pooled equally-weighted rival portfolios are formed by grouping rivals by 
announcement.
cSize-matched rivals are found by selecting one size-matched rival for each announcing firm.
dPatell-Z = Standardized residual Z test statistics by Patell (1976)
eBW-T = Traditional T test statistics by Brown and Warner (1980)




Analysts’ current fiscal year EPS raw and abnormal forecast revisions, over the 13-month
period centered around dividend initiation announcements, for 908 firms that are rivals to
120 dividend initiating firms in 80 industries based on the SIC code.
Raw revisions are calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts 
divided by the stock price 15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions 
are calculated using a fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that 
the mean (median) of raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon 

























-6 -0.00486 0.00000“ 25.2 -0.00413 -0.00042“ 36.8 831
(0.077) (0.000) [33.9] (0.126) (0.000) [63.2]
-5 -0.00534 0.00000 29.9 -0.00319 -0.00017“ 42.2 843
(0.152) (0.062) [33.7] (0.431) (0.000) [57.8]
-4 -0.00029 0.00000 31.8 0.00239 -0.00009 45.6 842
(0.938) (0.799) [31.4] (0.578) (0.109) [54.4]
-3 0.00038 0.00000 34.5 0.00305 -0.00007 46.3 884
(0.824) (0.616) [31.3] (0.145) (0.180) [53.7]
.2 -0.00219 0.00000 28.5 -0.00028 -0.00022“ 42.5 898
(0.421) (0.279) [33.9] (0.912) (0.001) [57.5]
-1 -0.00182 0.00000 32.7 -0.00069 -0.00021* 43.5 903
(0.424) (0.444) [31.2] (0.820) (0.017) [56.5]
0 0.06124 0.00000 32.2 0.06141 -0.00027“ 41.3 908
(0.342) (0.756) [32.8] (0.339) (0.000) [58.6]
+ 1 0.00699 0.00000 29.8 -0.02425 -0.00031“ 39.6 909
(0.187) (0.052) [35.0] (0.461) (0.000) [60.3]
+ 2 0.00078 0.00000 30.6 -0.02012 -0.00024“ 41.7 911
(0.557) (0.490) [32.5] (0.352) (0.000) [58.2]
+ 3 -0.00100 0.00000 29.0 -0.00146 -0.00020“ 40.6 906
(0.591) (0.123) [35.0] (0.533) (0.000) [59.4]
+ 4 0.00246 0.00000 29.3 0.00196 -0.00026“ 40.7 907
(0.736) (0.437) [35.0] (0.804) (0.000) [59.3]
+ 5 -0.00306 0.00000 30.6 -0.00464 -0.00026“ 39.8 832
(0.340) (0.171) [35.5] (0.285) (0.001) [60.2]
+ 6 -0.00159 0.00000“ 28.2 -0.00122 -0.00034“ 40.1 822
(0.232) (0.001) [38.9] (0.442) (0.000) [59.9]
*‘Significant at the 1% level. ‘Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 24
Analysts’ current fiscal year EPS raw and abnormal forecast revisions, over the 13-month 
period centered around dividend initiation announcements, for 120 equally-weighted rival 
portfolios that are grouped by dividend initiation announcements.
Raw revisions are calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts 
divided by the stock price 15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions 
are calculated using a fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that 
the mean (median) of raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon 

























-6 -0.00092 0.00000 42.5 -0.00075 -0.00073** 32.1 106
(0.408) (0.695) [43.4] (0.614) (0.004) [67.9]
-5 -0.00051 0.00000 43.1 0.00004 -0.00024 43.1 109
(0.900) (0.528) [45.9] (0.992) (0.287) [56.9]
-4 -0.00350 0.00000 43.1 -0.00312 -0.00033 43.1 109
(0.089) (0.302) [47.7] (0.188) (0.425) [56.9]
-3 0.00010 0.00000 50.0 0.00105 -0.00005 47.4 116
(0.973) (0.118) [32.8] (0.723) (0.385) [52.6]
-2 -0.00123 0.00000 47.9 -0.00037 -0.00008 47.0 117
(0.597) (0.615) [39.3] (0.867) (0.834) [53.0]
-1 -0.00069 0.00009 51.7 0.00040 0.00003 50.8 118
(0.720) (0.132) [37.3] (0.841) (0.237) [49.2]
0 -0.00224 0.00000 45.8 -0.00088 -0.00032 43.3 120
(0.815) (0.339) [45.0] (0.923) (0.643) [56.7]
1 0.00709 0.00000 43.3 0.00671 -0.00068** 35.0 120
(0.372) (0.511) [40.8] (0.505) (0.001) [65.0]
2 -0.00025 0.00000 43.1 -0.00133 -0.00054* 33.9 121
(0.785) (0.942) [38.8] (0.595) (0.024) [66.1]
3 0.00106 0.00000 47.1 0.00145 -0.00025 41.3 121
(0.420) (0.291) [38.8] (0.404) (0.765) [58.7]
4 0.00256 0.00000 43.8 0.00246 -0.00015 47.9 121
(0.621) (0.943) [40.5] (0.662) (0.650) [52.1]
5 0.00241 0.00000 43.7 0.00033 -0.00030 46.2 119
(0.385) (0.885) [46.2] (0.931) (0.954) [53.8]
6 -0.00261 0.00000 37.7 -0.00364 -0.00109** 34.5 119
(0.116) (0.175) [47.1] (0.064) (0.001) [65.5]
"“ Significant at the 1% level. “Significant at the 5 % level.
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Table 25
Analysts’ current fiscal year EPS raw and abnormal forecast revisions, over the 13-month
period centered around dividend initiation announcements, for 120 firm size- matched rivals
that correspond to 120 dividend initiating firms.
Raw revisions are calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts 
divided by the stock price 15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions 
are calculated using a fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that 
the mean (median) of raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon 

























-6 -0.00816 0.00000 20.0 -0.00900 -0.00048* 38.1 105
(0.349) (0.774) [21.9] (0.399) (0.040) [61.9]
-5 -0.02095 0.00000 36.4 -0.02021 0.00003 52.3 107
(0.462) (0.340) [27.1] (0.482) (0.648) [47.7]
-4 -0.02378 0.00000 24.0 -0.01922 -0.00025 42.3 104
(0.246) (0.192) [27.9] (0.224) (0.325) [57.7]
-3 -0.00087 0.00000 29.7 0.00909 -0.00002 49.5 111
(0.878) (0.476) [19.8] (0.380) (0.797) [50.5]
-2 -0.01050 0.00000 31.0 -0.00048 -0.00012 45.7 116
(0.305) (0.990) [27.6] (0.935) (0.549) [54.3]
-1 0.00104 0.00000 25.9 0.01162 -0.00028 41.4 116
(0.776) (0.387) [20.7] (0.282) (0.677) [58.6]
0 -0.01953 0.00000 35.8 -0.01317 -0.00008 47.5 120
(0.352) (0.079) [22.5] (0.529) (0.753) [52.5]
1 0.04500 0.00000 25.2 0.05140 -0.00029* 35.3 119
(0.236) (0.625) [21.0] (0.214) (0.011) [64.7]
2 -0.00224 0.00000 23.5 -0.00501 -0.00032 38.7 119
(0.422) (0.879) [21.8] (0.460) (0.062) [61.3]
3 0.00115 0.00000 30.3 -0.00342 -0.00008 46.2 119
(0.746) (0.282) [21.8] (0.608) (0.845) [53.8]
4 0.01241 0.00000 22.7 0.01241 -0.00051 35.3 119
(0.822) (0.766) [23.5] (0.910) (0.052) [64.7]
5 -0.01639 0.00000 33.6 -0.01639 -0.00009 44.5 119
(0.441) (0.483) [24.4] (0.345) (0.908) [55.5]
6 -0.00323 0.00000* 19.7 -0.00323 -0.00078** 32.5 117
(0.130) (0.050) [32.5] (0.750) (0.001) [67.5]
• ’ Significant at the 1% level. ’ Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 26
Analysts’ following fiscal year EPS raw and abnormal forecast revisions, over the 13-month
period centered around dividend initiation announcements, for 685 firms that are rivals to
103 dividend initiating firms in 69 industries based on the SIC code.
Raw revisions are calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts 
divided by the stock price 15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions 
are calculated using a fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that 
the mean (median) of raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon 

























-6 -0.00110 0.00000“ 26.6 0.00311 -0.00002 49.6 639
(0.368) (0.000) [38.3] (0.106) (0.092) [50.4]
-5 -0.00318* 0.00000“ 27.1 0.00223 -0.00004 48.3 654
(0.045) (0.000) [37.9] (0.369) (0.110) [51.7]
-4 -0.00492 0.00000 31.9 -0.00294 0.00002 51.7 652
(0.378) (0.958) [32.2] (0.602) (0.257) [48.3]
-j -0.00010 0.00000 30.4 0.00260 0.00003 51.0 672
(0.905) (0.121) [36.2] (0.121) (0.297) [49.0]
-2 -0.00003 0.00000* 28.4 0.00185 0.00000 49.9 679
(0.980) (0.016) [36.2] (0.341) (0.769) [49.9]
-1 -0.00277 0.00000“ 28.1 -0.00114 -0.00010* 45.8 675
(0.095) (0.002) [37.0] (0.134) (0.025) [53.9]
0 -0.04381 0.00000* 29.6 -0.04196 -0.00001 49.2 685
(0.280) (0.014) [36.9] (0.294) (0.143) [50.4]
+ 1 0.01558 0.00000* 29.0 0.03775 -0.00002 48.5 686
(0.364) (0.014) [37.5] (0.155) (0.298) [51.2]
+ 2 0.00332 0.00000 30.7 0.01321 -0.00005 48.2 677
(0.284) (0.055) [36.8] (0.393) (0.615) [51.6] ,
+ 3 -0.00078 0.00000“ 28.1 -0.00342 -0.00004 48.3 675
(0.443) (0.001) [37.6] (0.462) (0.828) [51.4]
+ 4 0.00004 0.00000 32.0 0.00158 -0.00003 48.4 682
(0.962) (0.629) [35.3] (0.059) (0.586) [51.3]
+ 5 -0.00229* 0.00000“ 25.3 -0.00187 -0.00011 45.3 645
(0.034) (0.006) [36.3] (0.106) (0.143) [54.6]
+ 6 -0.00111 0.00000** 30.8 -0.00048 -0.00015* 44.4 637
(0.387) (0.005) [37.0] (0.744) (0.023) [55.4]
* ‘ S ign i f i c an t  at the  1% l eve l .  ‘ S ign i f i c an t  at the  5 %  level .
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Table 27
Analysts’ following fiscal year EPS raw and abnormal forecast revisions, over the 13-month 
period centered around dividend initiation announcements, for 103 equally-weighted rival 
portfolios that are grouped by dividend initiation announcements.
Raw revisions are calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts 
divided by the stock price 15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions 
are calculated using a fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that 
the mean (median) of raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon 

























-6 0.00028 0.00000 35.7 0.00212 0.00034 58.2 98
(0.698) (0.577) [46.9] (0.059) (0.199) [41.8]
-5 0.00020 -0.00018 34.3 0.00276 -0.00012 45.1 102
(0.898) (0.061) [56.9] (0.371) (0.487) [54.9]
-4 -0.00218 0.00000 36.9 -0.00204 -0.00001 48.5 103
(0.427) (0.234) [46.6] (0.443) (0.914) [51.5]
-3 -0.00090 0.00000 39.3 -0.00047 -0.00001 49.5 107
(0.673) (0.570) [47.7] (0.843) (0.539) [50.5]
-2 -0.00060 0.00000 38.7 -0.00003 -0.00004 49.1 106
(0.325) (0.286) [46.2] (0.979) (0.869) [50.9]
-1 -0.00072 0.00000 43.1 0.00008 0.00010 51.0 102
(0.355) (0.951) [37.3] (0.899) (0.764) [49.0]
0 -0.00944 0.00000 39.8 -0.00803 -0.00001 48.5 103
(0.073) (0.319) [44.7] (0.101) (0.801) [51.5]
1 0:01155 -0.00013 36.3 -0.01627 0.00003 50.0 102
(0.362) (0.245) [53.9] (0.203) (0.704) [50.0]
2 0.00309 0.00000 45.2 0.00245 0.00003 50.0 104
(0.253) (0.722) [44.2] (0.650) (0.482) [50.0]
3 -0.00009 -0.00015 33.0 -0.00174 -0.00020 41.7 103
(0.928) (0.252) [53.4] (0.657) (0.375) [58.3]
4 -0.00035 0.00000 40.2 0.00159 0.00013 52.3 107
(0.819) (0.429) [44.9] (0.368) (0.559) [47.7]
5 -0.00036 0.00000 34.3 -0.00027 -0.00007 43.8 105
(0.615) (0.142) [48.6] (0.787) (0.915) [56.2]
6 -0.00171 0.00000 42.7 -0.00148 -0.00003 46.6 103
(0.363) (0.892) [43.7] (0.427) (0.951) [53.4]
“ Significant at the 1% level. ‘ Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 28
Analysts’ following fiscal year EPS raw and abnormal forecast revisions, over the 13-month
period centered around dividend initiation announcements, for 99 firm size- matched rivals
that correspond to 99 dividend initiating firms.
Raw revisions are calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts 
divided by the stock price 15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions 
are calculated using a fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that 
the mean (median) of raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon 

























-6 0.00075 0.00000 23.0 0.00490* 0.00036* 64.4 87
(0.610) (0.830) [25.3] (0.028) (0.020) [35.6]
-5 0.00152 0.00000 30.2 0.00354 0.00018 57.3 96
(0.616) (0.305) [31.3] (0.320) (0.873) [42.7]
-4 -0.03871 0.00000 25.6 -0.03829 0.00015 55.6 90
(0.336) (0.463) [20.2] (0.340) (0.180) [44.4]
-3 0.00053 0.00000 19.4 0.00949 0.00020 55.1 98
(0.867) (0.792) [23.5] (0.335) (0.170) [44.9]
-2 -0.00264 0.00000 23.1 0.00406 -0.00001 49.5 91
(0.076) (0.322) [24.2] (0.624) (0.635) [50.5]
-1 -0.01104 0.00000 30.4 -0.00338 0.00007 52.2 92
(0.337) (0.966) [19.6] (0.359) (0.727) [46.7]
0 -0.00696 0.00000 18.2 -0.00021 0.00011 55.6 99
(0.166) (0.323) [27.3] (0.985) (0.454) [43.4]
1 0.11936 0.00000 24.0 0.12273 0.00010 54.2 96
(0.332) (0.501) [31.3] (0.311) (0.260) [44.8]
2 0.01881 0.00000 25.3 -0.01646 0.00002 51.5 99
(0.268) (0.779) [22.2] (0.717) (0.316) [47.5]
3 0.00192 0.00000 27.7 -0.02924 0.00000 50.0 94
(0.428) (0.705) [26.6] (0.369) (0.699) [47.9]
4 0.00008 0.00000 24.2 0.00154 -0.00004 44.2 95
(0.955) (0.495) [27.4] (0.380) (0.902) [53.7]
5 -0.00014 0.00000 23.7 -0.00019 0.00000 49.5 97
(0.920) (0.996) [23.7] (0.900) (0.619) [49.5]
6 -0.00114 0.00000 30.2 -0.00197 -0.00007 43.8 96
(0.583) (0.843) [24.0] (0.357) (0.319) [55.2]
*‘ Significant at the 1% level. ‘ Significant at the 5 % level.
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announcement month. Twenty-four statistical tests of the significance of the 
announcement month forecast revisions are conducted in these tables. Only two 
tests demonstrate significance.
Table 23 shows that using the all-rivals-included rival portfolio formation 
method and the current year forecast sample, the median of abnormal forecast 
revision in month 0 is significant and negative. Table 26 shows that using the all- 
rivals-included rival portfolio formation method and the following year forecast 
sample, the median of raw forecast revision is statistically different from zero.
Table 29 reports the same 24 statistical tests for the clean sample. Again, 
the same two tests show significance. I interpret this evidence as suggesting that 
analysts on average do not revise their earnings forecasts for rivals of dividend 
initiating firms. Therefore, dividend initiations appear to reveal no industry-wide 
information about future earnings.
The effects of market conditions and business cycles on the rivals’ stock price 
reactions and on the rivals’ earnings forecast revisions are reported in table 30 and 
tables 31 to 33. Evidence shows that rivals’ stock price reaction is insensitive to 
market/economy conditions. In fact, the two-day cumulative average abnormal 
return is statistically insignificant in every subsample of table 30.
Evidence from the earnings forecasts in tables 31, 32, and 33 is mixed. For 
example, table 31 shows that the announcement month raw revision for the 
following year forecast is significant and negative in the bear market condition and 
in the declining business cycle. However, the revision in the bull market or in the
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Table 29
Announcement-month raw and abnormal forecast revisions of EPS for the clean sample of 
dividend initiation rival firms.
The clean sample excludes rivals which correspond to dividend initiation announcements 
contaminated by other WSJI news within the (-15,+ 15) window. Raw revisions are 
calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts divided by the stock price 
15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions are calculated using a 
fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that the mean (median) of 
raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon signed-rank) test. The 
two-tailed test p-value is given in parenthesis.
Mean of Median of Mean of Median of
Rival raw raw Percentage abnormal abnormal Percentage
forming forecast forecast positive forecast forecast positive N
method revision revision [negative] revision revision [negative]
Panel A: The current fiscal year forecast
All3 0.16774 0.00000 32.8 0.16705 -0.00024* 43.5 345
(0.323) (0.717) [34.5] (0.323) (0.031) [56.5]
Eventb 0.01866 0.00000 44.7 0.01886 -0.00056 47.4 38
(0.315) (0.596) [47.4] (0.309) (0.826) [52.6]
Sizec 0.00182 0.00000 26.3 -0.00010 -0.00065 39.5 38
(0.439) (0.890) [36.8] (0.976) (0.593) [60.5]
Panel B: The following fiscal year forecast
All3 -0.10679 0.00000* 28.0 -0.10406 -0.00010 47.8 268
(0.303) (0.012) [41.8] (0.309) (0.328) [52.2]
Eventb -0.01397 0.00000 39.4 -0.01315 0.00055 54.5 33
(0.261) (0.574) [42.4] (0.285) (0.558) [45.5]
Size0 -0.00871 0.00000 12.5 -0.00788 0.00070 65.6 32
(0.349) (0.217) [31.3] (0.388) (0.137) [34.4]
“‘Significant at the 1% level.
“Significant at the 5% level.
aAll rivals that share the same 4-digit SIC codes with the announcing firms are included. 
bEvent-pooled equally-weighted rival portfolios are formed by grouping rivals by 
announcement.
cSize-matched rivals are found by selecting one size-matched rival for each announcing firm.
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Table 30
A cross-sectional analysis of announcement period two-day cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAR(_10)) for rivals of dividend initiation firms traded on NYSE/ASE and the 
announcement month market/economy conditions.
The bull/average/bear market is based on the definition of Fabozzi and Francis (1977). 





Positive Patell-Zd BW-T° BMP-Tf N
Alla -0.222
Panel A: Bull market subsample 
43.4 -1.29 -1.62 -1.19 1057
Eventb -0.339 44.4 -0.57 -1.12 -0.58 72
Size0 -0.188 47.2 0.01 -0.29 0.01 72
All3 -0.019
Panel B: Average market subsample 
48.7 0.85 -0.18 0.85 1936
Eventb 0.069 46.8 0.39 0.30 0.39 126
Size0 0.253 51.6 0.87 0.55 1.08 126
All3 0.045
Panel C: Bear market subsample 
49.9 0.35 0.20 0.26 547
Eventb 0.546 60.5 0.66 1.07 0.54 38
Size0 -0.240 47.4 -1.35 -0.24 -1.05 38
All3 -0.062
Panel D: Growth business cycle subsample 
47.2 0.14 -0.70 0.14 2825
Eventb -0.012 47.5 -0.25 -0.06 -0.24 198
Size0 0.075 47.5 0.06 0.20 0.06 198
All3 -0.103
Panel E: Decline business cycle subsample 
47.7 -0.15 -0.56 -0.12 715
Event5 0.198 52.6 1.13 0.53 1.18 38
Size0 -0.149 60.5 0.11 -0.15 0.15 38
aAll rivals that share the same four-digit SIC codes with the announcing firms are included. 
bEvent-pooled equally-weighted rival portfolios are formed by grouping rivals by 
announcement.
°Size-matched rivals are found by selecting one size-matched rival for each announcing firm.
dPatell-Z = Standardized residual Z test statistics by Patell (1976)
eBW-T = Traditional T test statistics by Brown and Warner (1980)




Announcement-month raw and abnormal forecast revisions of earnings per share and 
market/economy conditions for all of the rivals to dividend initiation firms.
The bull/average/bear market is based on the definition of Fabozzi and Francis (1977). 
The growth/decline business cycle classification is given by NBER. Raw revisions are 
calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts divided by the stock price 
15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions are calculated using a 
fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that the mean (median) of 
raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon signed-rank) test. The 
two-tailed test p-value is given in parenthesis.
Market Mean of Median of Mean of Median of
or raw raw Percentage abnormal abnormal Percentage
economy forecast forecast positive forecast forecast positive N
condition revision revision [negative] revision revision [negative]
Panel A: The current fiscal year forecast
Bull3 -0.00683 0.00000* 34.9 -0.00797 -0.00015 45.4 304
(0.409) (0.020) [31.6] (0.322) (0.510) [54.6]
Averageb 0.10046 0.00000 31.1 0.10111 -0.00030** 38.6 573
(0.325) (0.151) [33.0] (0.320) (0.000) [61.4]
Bear0 0.00382 0.00000 25.8 0.00791 0.00043 51.6 31
(0.208) (0.960) [41.9] (0.082) (0.376) [48.4]
Growthd 0.07798 0.00000 33.7 0.07811 -0.00029** 40.2 722
(0.336) (0.075) [29.9] (0.333) (0.000) [59.7]
Decline0 -0.00376* 0.00000* 26.3 -0.00344 -0.00012 45.7 186
(0.036) (0.017) [44.1] (0.195) (0.169) [54.3]
Panel B: The following fiscal year forecast
Bull3 -0.00306 0.00000 30.4 -0.00245 0.00006 54.0 224
(0.111) (0.746) [32.6] (0.180) (0.924) [45.1]
Averageb -0.06725 0.00000* 30.3 -0.06390 -0.00009 46.7 435
(0.292) (0.014) [38.4] (0.310) (0.071) [53.1]
Bear0 r0.00278* -0.00007* 11.5 -0.01534 -0.00016 50.0 26
(0.037) (0.011) [50.0] (0.276) (0.720) [50.0]
Growthd -0.05378 0.00000 33.4 -0.05225 0.00000 49.7 533
(0.302) (0.797) [32.3] (0.309) (0.422) [49.7]
Decline0 -0.00885* * -0.00033** 16.4 -0.00590 -0.00012 47.4 152
(0.007) (0.000) [53.3] (0.060) (0.111) [52.6]
*‘Significant at the 1% level.
‘ Significant at the 5 % level.
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Table 32
Announcement-month raw and abnormal forecast revisions of earnings per share and 
market/economy conditions for event-pooled equally-weighted rival portfolios.
The bull/average/bear market is based on the definition of Fabozzi and Francis (1977). 
The growth/decline business cycle classification is given by NBER. Raw revisions are 
calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts divided by the stock price 
15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions are calculated using a 
fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that the mean (median) of 
raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon signed-rank) test. The 
two-tailed test p-value is given in parenthesis.
Market Mean of Median of Mean of Median of
or raw raw Percentage abnormal abnormal Percentage
economy forecast forecast positive forecast forecast positive N
condition revision revision [negative] revision revision [negative]
Panel A: The current fiscal year forecast
Bull3 -0.01771 0.00024 52.6 -0.01598 -0.00028 47.4 38
(0.423) (0.127) [44.7] (0.452) (0.675) [52.6]
Averageb 0.00523 0.00000 43.8 0.00608 -0.00056 39.7 73
(0.629) (0.834) [45.2] (0.553) (0.138) [60.3]
Bear0 0.00248 0.00000 33.3 0.00635 0.00060' 55.6 9
(0.284) (0.688) [44.4] (0.079) (0.301) [44.4]
Growthd -0.00253 0.00000 45.0 -0.00076 -0.00030 43.1 109
(0.810) (0.353) [45.0] (0.940) (0.853) [56.9]
Decline0 0.00067 0.00007 54.5 -0.00216 -0.00236 45.5 11
(0.741) (0.966) [45.5] (0.497) (0.365) [54.5]
Panel B: The following fiscal year forecast
Bull3 -0.00346 0.00034 56.3 -0.00255 0.00054 56.3 32
(0.215) (0.741) [37.5] (0.379) (0.688) [43.7]
Averageb -0.01338 0.00000 36.5 -0.01113 -0.00001 49.2 63
(0.116) (0.415) [44.4] (0.158) (0.925) [50.8]
Bear0 -0.00235 -0.00103* 0.0 -0.00545 -0.00109 12.5 8
(0.923) (0.031) [75.0] (0.180) (0.109) [87.5]
Growthd -0.00972 0.00000 40.9 -0.00822 -0.00001 49.5 93
(0.095) (0.616) [43.0] (0.128) (0.821) [50.5]
Decline0 -0.00688 -0.00022 30.0 -0.00621 -0.00173 40.0 10
(0.164) (0.098) [60.0] (0.220) (0.193) [60.0]
**Significant at the 1% level.
•Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 33
Announcement-month raw and abnormal forecast revisions of earnings per share and 
market/economy conditions for single firm size-matched rivals.
The bull/average/bear market is based on the definition of Fabozzi and Francis (1977). 
The growth/decline business cycle classification is given by NBER. Raw revisions are 
calculated as the difference between consecutive monthly forecasts divided by the stock price 
15 days before the announcement. Abnormal forecast revisions are calculated using a 
fourth-order moving average model. I test the null hypothesis that the mean (median) of 
raw or abnormal revision equals zero using the student t (Wilcoxon signed-rank) test. The
wo-tailed test p-value is given in parenthesis.
Market Mean of Median of Mean of Median of
or raw raw Percentage abnormal abnormal Percentage
economy forecast forecast positive forecast forecast positive N
condition revision revision [negative] revision revision [negative]
Panel A: The current fiscal year forecast
Bull3 -0.05775 0.00000* 44.7 -0.05600 0.00031 52.6 38
(0.382) (0.021) [26.3] (0.376) (0.342) [47.4]
Averageb -0.00281 0.00000 32.9 0.00572 -0.00024 42.5 73
(0.600) (0.622) [20.5] (0.597) (0.418) [57.5]
Bear0 0.00624 0.00000 22.2 0.01450 0.00147 66.7 9
(0.388) (0.625) [22.2] (0.096) (0.164) [33.3]
Growthd -0.02276 0.00000 33.9 -0.01594 -0.00007 47.7 109
(0.324) (0.196) [23.9] (0.489) (0.999) [52.3]
Decline' 0.01248 0.00077 54.5 0.01430 -0.00030 45.5 11
(0.254) (0.156) [9.1] (0.185) (0.365) [54.5]
Panel B: The following fiscal year forecast
Bull3 -0.00564 0.00000 22.6 -0.00616 0.00011 54.8 31
(0.242) (0.487) [32.3] (0.199) (0.605) [45.2]
Average13 -0.00785 0.00000 18.3 0.00906 0.00012 58.3 60
(0.323) (0.912) [21.7] (0.600) (0.121) [40.0]
Bear' -0.00536 -0.00007 0.0 -0.04673 -0.00042 37.5 8
(0.169) (0.125) [50.0] (0.330) (0.461) [62.5]
Growthd -0.00766 0.00000 18.9 -0.00028 0.00011 55.6 90
(0.166) (0.310) [28.9] (0.982) (0.486) [43.3]
Decline' 0.00005 0.00000 11.1 0.00043 0.00008 55.6 9
(0.764) (1.000) [11.1] (0.710) (0.820) [44.4]
*‘ Significant at the 1% level.
‘ Significant at the 5 % level.
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growing business cycle is insignificant. This result is consistent with my prediction. 
On the other hand, table 33 shows that the use of the firm-size-matched rival 
method on the following year forecast generates insignificant forecast revisions 
under any market/economy condition. Therefore, this evidence fails to support the 
hypothesized market/economy condition effect.
3.5. Conclusion
This chapter explores the intra-industry effects associated with dividend 
initiation announcements. A positive rival reaction will indicate a contagion intra­
industry information transfer while a negative response will show the dominance of 
a competitive effect. No reaction will be detected if the information is firm-specific.
I use the SIC code to identify industry rivals from the CRSP tape. An 
analysis of rivals’ stock price reaction provides evidence regarding the nature of the 
information conveyed by dividend initiation decisions. On average I find that the 
rivals’ stock prices do not react to the announcement. The analysis of earnings 
forecasts of rivals also reveals no significant revisions by analysts during the 
announcement month. Overall the results support the hypothesis that dividend 
initiations convey firm-specific information and therefore have no effect on rivals.
This evidence is consistent with that of Healy and Palepu (1988) who report 
that dividend initiating firms experience higher earnings growth than their rivals. 
This finding also parallels Hertzel’s (1991) evidence that share repurchase 
announcements do not lead to intra-industry information transfers. Furthermore, 
because the information is firm-specific only, the firm-specific risk is likely to be
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reduced after the announcement. Therefore, the results are also consistent with 
those of Ventakesh (1989).
Chapter 4 
Concluding Remarks
This dissertation examines the nature of the information conveyed by 
dividend initiation announcements. The dividend information hypothesis suggests 
that firms initiate/increase dividend payments because their management believes 
that higher earnings can be achieved in the future. Therefore, initial dividends 
reveal favorable earnings information to the market. Chapter 2 documents a 
positive earnings forecast revision by analysts during the announcement month. 
This result not only lends support to the information hypothesis but also helps 
resolve the conflicting evidence of the earnings forecast revision at the 
announcement of dividend changes found by Ofer and Siegel (1987) and by Lang 
and Litzenberger (1989).
Chapter 3 studies the intra-industry information transfer inferred from 
announcements of dividend initiations. Literature suggests three types of intra­
industry effects on rivals: contagion effect, competitive effect, and no effect. I 
document no significant rival stock price reaction at the announcement. I also find 
that analysts do not significantly revise their earnings forecasts for rivals of firms 
that initiate their dividends. This evidence supports the hypothesis that initiation 
announcements convey firm-specific information only.
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